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Summary
The problem of fault diagnosis for process plant has become increasingly important.
This is due to the growing demands on higher product quality and operational
reliability. This thesis addresses the problem of fault diagnosis in process plants
using Finite-State Automaton (FSA) Model. A FSA model partitions the state-
space into finite regions and contains information on system trajectory across these
regions. An integrated fault diagnosis scheme is developed based on the FSAmodel.
In this thesis, we give the procedures to build the diagnostic system for a
process plant, which include the fault modelling and the fault detection and iso-
lation algorithm. A FSA model for fault diagnosis is automatically obtained for
a process plant by given continuous differential equations and a set of boundaries
of the state variables. The FSA model of the system is represented by a set of
Finite-State Automaton Tables (FATs), which describe the possible discrete state
transitions under the normal and fault conditions. The FATs serve as the input
to the fault detection and isolation algorithm. We introduce the definition of fault
diagnosability of the system, identify some conditions for nondiagnosability and
provide an algorithm for testing the fault diagnosability. We discuss the strategies
for dynamical choice of the set of boundaries that make a diagnosable system and
reduce the computational complexity. All these issues are well integrated in the
design of the fault diagnosis system.
A real time monitoring system is developed to implement on-line fault diagnosis
for process plants. The application of the fault diagnosis algorithm is illustrated




1.1 Overview of Fault Diagnosis Problem
The fault detection and isolation in industrial systems is of great importance and
economic significance. Several of the industrial disasters and accidents in the past
have cost millions of dollars. Malfunctions of plant equipment and instrumentation
increase the operating costs of the plants. Safety, higher productivity and oper-
ational reliability call for quick and accurate diagnosis of the faulty components.
The early detection of the occurrence of faults may help avoid the catastrophic
failure that these simple faulty components produced. Thus, the effective methods
of fault diagnosis can not only prevent the undesirable failures, but also enhance
the quality, safety, reliability, and economy of industrial process.
The terms fault and failure are used interchangeably in the literature as well
as in the practical usage. A fault is often defined to be any departure from an
acceptable range of an observed variable or calculated parameter associated with
the system. A fault implies a certain level of degradation of performance. Failure
on the other hand denotes a complete operational breakdown of equipment or the
process. These two terms are used as synonyms in this thesis.
Fault diagnosis systems implement the following tasks: Fault detection, fault
isolation and fault identification. Fault detection is defined to indicate something
is going wrong in the system; Fault isolation is the determination of the exact
1
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location of fault; Fault identification is the determination of the magnitude of
the fault. More practical systems contain only the fault detection and isolation
stages (FDI system) and in many cases “diagnosis” is used simply as a synonym
to “isolation”. Fault diagnosis is used to indicate the whole diagnostic process in
this thesis.
Fault diagnosis may be implemented based on off-line periodic equipment tests
or spot checks. These occasional methods sometimes require the shutdown of the
process which may lost a lot of money during the testing period and also cannot
detect and prevent the faults timely. Therefore, the need for an effective manage-
ment of early detection and localization of malfunctions calls for powerful on-line
fault detection and isolation techniques. Process monitoring is preferred and has
been developed. Process monitoring is a continuous real-time task of recogniz-
ing anomalies in the behavior of a dynamic system and identifying the underlying
faults. Incorporating a fault monitoring system into an industrial process results
in improved reliability, maintainability and survivability. In contrast to the earlier
work on fault detection and isolation, process monitoring poses three special diffi-
culties: 1. Diagnosis must be performed while the system operates. 2. Few system
parameters are observable. Monitoring is typically based on a small subset of the
system parameters, with limited opportunity to probe other parameters. 3. The
system is dynamic. The system exhibits time-varying behavior, parameter values
vary over a continuous range, the system has state and feedback is common. We
note that our emphasis in this work is on-line diagnosis of system faults.
1.2 Review of Fault Diagnosis Approaches
As the problem of fault diagnosis for process plant has become increasingly impor-
tant, it has received considerable attention in many research fields. A wide variety
of schemes have been proposed and used in different application areas. Various
approaches for fault diagnosis can be classified into three groups : limit checking
approach, model-based approach and artificial intelligence approach. A good sur-
vey of various methods used in process supervision and diagnosis can be found in
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[1][2].
1.2.1 Limit Checking Approach
A fault can be understood as a non-permitted deviation of a characteristic property
of the process itself, the actuators, the sensors and controllers. The normal fault
detection and isolation function consists of checking the measurable variables with
regard to a certain tolerance of normal values (limit or trend checking) and trigger
alarms if the tolerances are exceeded.
In many systems, there are two levels of limits, the first level is used for pre-
warning and the second level is used to trigger an emergency reaction. Limit
checking may be extended to the trend analysis of the process characteristics.
While simple and straightforward, the limit checking approach suffers from two
serious drawbacks:
• The threshold need to be set quiet conservatively as the plant variables may
vary widely due to normal input variations.
• The effect of single component fault may propagate to many plant variables,
which lead to a large number of alarms being set off in rapid succession and
make the isolation of faults extremely difficult. This process is normally
referred to as alarm analysis.
In limit checking approach, the most widely used scheme for alarm analysis
is based on fault trees [3, 4, 5]. Fault trees provide a graphical representation of
cause-effect relationships of faults in a system. A fault tree is built by reasoning
backwards from the system failure to basic or primal failures that represent the
root cause of the failure. The primary drawbacks of this approach are:
• Fault trees require a great deal of effort in their construction.
• They pose difficulties in handling feedback systems.
For improved performance, a natural first step consists of adding more sensors
and a second step to transfer the operator’s knowledge into computers. Because
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the number of sensors, transmitters and cables increases, the cost goes up and
overall reliability is not necessarily improved. Furthermore many faults cannot
be detected directly by available sensor technology. Therefore being very simple,
this approach has the above serious drawbacks. Consistency checks for groups of
plant variables can eliminate some of the above problems as described in the next
section.
1.2.2 Model-based Approach
Model-based approach took an important role in the prominent FDI techniques.
Most of the model-based FDI methods rely on the comparison of a system’s avail-
able measurements, with a prior information represented by the system model. A
wide variety of model-based fault diagnosis methods and applications have been
studied and summarized in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Analytical Redundancy
Most model-based fault diagnosis methods rely on the concept of analytical redun-
dancy. One of the earlier work done on this can be found in [11]. In contrast
to physical redundancy, when measurements from different sensors are compared,
now sensory measurements are compared to analytically obtained values of the
respective variable. Such computations use present and/or previous measurements
of other variables and the mathematical model describing their relationship. The
resulting differences are called residues.
The procedure of evaluation of the redundancy given by any of the mathe-
matical models describing the system can be roughly divided into the following
steps:
1. Residual generation. The residual generator performs some kind of validation
of the nominal relationships of the system, using the actual input and the
measured output and generating the residual which normally is zero. The
redundancy relations to be evaluated can simply be interpreted as input-
output relations of the dynamics. If a fault occurs, the redundancy relations
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are no longer satisfied and the residuals deviate from zero.
2. Residual analysis : decision and isolation of the faults. The residuals are
examined for the likelihood of faults using appropriate decision functions or
statistic methods.
The major advantage of this approach is the ability to detect, not only abrupt
faults but also slowly developing faults via trend analysis. The primary drawbacks
of this approach are:
• Computational expenditure for the detailed on-line modeling of the process.
• The sensitivity of the detection process with respect to modeling errors and
measurement noise.
Parameter Estimation
Fault detection and isolation via parameter estimation relies on the principle that
possible faults in the monitored process can be associated with specific parameters
and states of a mathematical model of a process given in general by an input-output
relation.
This method requires an accurate model, which usually derived from the basic
balance equations for mass, energy, and momentum. The models will then appear
in the continuous or discrete time domain, in the form of ordinary or partial dif-
ferential or difference equations. Their parameters are expressed in dependence on
process coefficients, like storage or resistance quantities, whose changes indicate a
process fault.
Decision making whether a fault has occurred can be done with the aid of a
fault catalogue in which the relationship between process faults and changes in the
coefficients has been established. They can be based on simple threshold levels or
by using more sophisticated methods from statistical decision theory.
The main advantage of this method is that the state estimation method is the
existence of a mathematical model which is accurate and reliable enough for fault
diagnosis. The drawback is that the method has problems with the system where
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the operating point drifts or where the linearization is not accurate enough. A
good treatise on FDI using parameter estimation can be found in [12, 13, 14].
Discrete Event System
Recently, there has been a lot of interests in modeling the process plant in the dis-
crete event system (DES) framework for fault diagnosis. Most large-scale dynamic
systems can be viewed as DES at some level of abstraction. Such abstraction can
be done for the purpose of supervisor control or for the purpose of fault diagnosis.
Discrete event systems are dynamic systems whose behavior is governed by the
occurrence of physical events that cause abrupt changes in the state of the system.
These systems are characterized by a discrete state space of logical values and event
driven dynamics. In a discrete event model for fault diagnosis, the fault status of
system components are represented by states and their results are described by
events. The main issue is to determine if the system is in a failed state or if some
failure events have happened based on the available observations of the system
behavior and using model-based inferencing.
Various diagnostic systems in DES differ from each other both in their descrip-
tion and in their implementation. DES model can be represented by automata,
timed automata, rectangular automata and stochastic automata. Other descrip-
tions of discrete-event systems include formal languages, petri nets and max-plus
description. From the implementation point, these diagnostic systems can be clas-
sified as oﬄine or online. In Oﬄine method, the system is assumed to be in a
test-bed and the diagnostic system is to issue some test commands to infer prior
faults in the system. For Online diagnosis, the system is assumed to be operat-
ing continuously and the diagnostic system is to monitor the system behavior and
diagnose the faults in time.
DES approaches to fault diagnosis are most appropriate for diagnosing abrupt
yet non-catastrophic failures, i.e., failures that cause a distinct change in the be-
havior of the system but do not necessarily bring it to a halt. Such sharp failures
occur in a wide variety of technological systems including process control, au-
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tomated manufacturing systems, power systems, etc. As most interests of fault
diagnosis focus on the special state of the system, the major advantage of DES
approach is that it does not require the comparison of each point of value as done
in continuous system. The disadvantages are:
• Its complexity, the discrete nature of state and event spaces results in an
inevitable combinational explosion and most interesting DES are physically
large, contributing to this explosion. Human-imposed operational rules that
may involve arbitrary conditions add to the computational complexity.
• Its uncertainty, which may manifest itself as the inability to predict the next
state entered as a result of event, in which case models involving nondeter-
ministic features need to be used.
Some work using this method can be found in [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. In [20], the
authors give a good survey of DES to fault detection and diagnosis problem.
1.2.3 Artificial Intelligence Approach
Complex physical systems (e.g. a nuclear power plant) contain several types of
elements and processes with different types of descriptions. The purely mathemat-
ical or any other modeling methods could not offer adequate methodology with the
required accuracy to solve the problems arising in this field. Therefore, artificial
intelligence (AI) methods have been developed, which try to mimic the human way
of reasoning and making decisions.
Expert Systems
The method of expert system depends on a knowledge base, which represents the
experience of a human expert and uses inference engine to conclude from this
knowledge. Knowledge engineering is the process of building expert systems. This
process of building consists of two main activities which usually overlap: acquiring
the knowledge and implementing the system. The acquisition activity involves
the collection of knowledge about facts and reasoning strategies from the domain
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experts. In the system construction process, the system builders (i.e. knowledge
engineers), the domain experts and the users work together during all stages of the
process, which involves extensive prototyping. In the FDI world, an expert system
helps in full or partial automation of the diagnostic procedure in order to aid the
human diagnostician in real-time.
Some surveys on using expert systems can be found in [21, 22, 23, 24]. The
advantage of the expert system is that it is suitable for systems that are difficult
to model, which involving subtle and complicated interactions. The disadvantages
are:
• Considerable amount of time may elapse before enough knowledge is accu-
mulated to develop the necessary set of heuristic rules for reliable diagnosis.
• Domain dependent, expert systems are not easily portable from one system
to another.
• It is difficult to validate an expert system.
Model-based Reasoning
The basic paradigm of model-based reasoning for diagnosis can best be understood
as the interaction of observation and prediction [25]. Observation indicates what
the device is actually doing, prediction indicates what it’s supposed to do. The
interesting event is any difference between them, termed “discrepancy”. These
model-based methods employ a general purpose model of the structure and be-
havior of the system, which are constructed using standard AI technology such
as predicate logic, frames, constraints and rules. The algorithm for diagnosis are
also based on standard techniques in AI, like theorem proving, heuristic search,
constraint satisfaction and qualitative simulation.
The virtue of this method is its strong device independence, enabling us to
begin reasoning about a system as soon as its structure and behavior description is
available. It can be less costly to use, because the model needed is often supplied
by the description used to design and build the device in the first place. It is more
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likely to provide methodical coverage because the model building process supplies
a way of systematically enumerating the required knowledge.
This method of diagnosis is highly suitable for troubleshooting analog and dig-
ital circuits. However, applicability of this method for dynamic system is yet to
be fully demonstrated. Most of the model-based reasoners that have been pro-
posed for fault diagnosis of dynamic systems [26, 27, 28] are based on the general
diagnostic formalism proposed for static systems.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
The development of artificial neural networks was inspired by the way the human
brain works. An ANN consists of a large number of so interconnected neurons.
Each neuron can have many inputs and computes its output as a nonlinear function
of the weighted sum of its inputs. ANN’s typically consist of an input, one or several
intermediate, and one output layer with a huge number of neurons on each layer.
There are two main properties of ANN’s which make them interesting for this
task. First, they are able to approximate nonlinear functions very well. The second
important feature of ANN’s is that they are very good for pattern recognition
and classification tasks. As artificial neural networks do not use a mathematical
description of the system, the process called the “training of the network” has to
be taken to implement knowledge about the system. The principle of training is
to feed the network with the input of the system and adjust internal parameters
in a way that the output of the network gets closer to the real system output with
each cycle of learning.
The main advantages of artificial neural networks for fault diagnosis is that
no mathematical model is needed, so ANN’s are applicable to systems which are
difficult to model. The disadvantage of this method are:
• These methods require a set of training data which has to be taken from the
real process or any other process model. The reaction of the network is only
defined for situation for which it was trained. There is no general way to
make sure that it was trained for all possible cases.
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• For complex systems the number of neurons in the network can grow so that
the method gets very computation intensive.
The potential for this approach for chemical processes was initially proposed
in [29, 30]. More detailed analysis regarding the learning and generalization char-
acteristics of the method is given in [31]. A dynamic approach using moving time
window can be found in [32] [33].
Each method discussed in this chapter has its particular advantages and dis-
advantages. Which of these approaches one selects for a given system depends
on:
• The characteristics of the system.
• The kind of faults to be diagnosed.
• Knowledge available about the system.
• What criteria must be set (robustness etc.).
There is no sharp distinction between different techniques of fault diagnosis and
their regions of application. They may often be used to complement each other.
1.3 The Proposed Approach to Fault Diagnosis
1.3.1 Scope of the Approach
We present in this work, another new model-based approach to fault diagnosis
using Finite-State Automaton (FSA) model, which is based on the Discrete Event
System (DES) framework. The DES model for fault diagnosis has been discussed
in Section 1.2.2. In a discrete event model for fault diagnosis, the fault status
of system components are represented by states and their results are described
by events. Based on the available observations of the system behavior and using
model-based inferencing, the diagnostic system determines the failure states or
failure events.
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One of the important factors that distinguishes our work from most prior work
on fault diagnosis in DES is the following : unlike most of the other methods, the
designer has to define the individual component models and the sensor maps from
abstraction to obtain the complete discrete state model. In our work, the Finite-
State Automaton model for fault diagnosis can be automatically obtained by given
a system described by continuous differential equations and a set of boundaries
of the state variables. As the FSA model is directly mapped from the continuous
system, it enhances the accuracy of the representation of the system, which cannot
be guaranteed by the other methods using the abstraction to obtain the DES model.
Our modeling method is applicable not only to continuous dynamic systems, but
also to hybrid systems, which are partially modelled by differential equations.
Furthermore, the proposed approach is applicable for the large-scale dynamic
system. One of the consideration is the complexity of the DES system, that is the
discrete states result in an inevitable combinational state explosion if the system
is physically large. In many cases, only part of the state variables are affected by
a fault input, which can be exploited by the sparsity of the model. Therefore, for
the system represented by many state variables (differential equations), actually
only some of the state variables (differential equations) need to be used to model
the effect of the particular faults. This makes it profitable to consider sub-systems
of the overall system as the complexity of the system is significantly reduced.
Because of the uncertainty property of DES, given the initial state and the discrete
inputs, the model will predict all the possible trajectories of the system. The
nondeterministic feature of the model should be used. We note that in this work
the nondeterministic FSA model is constructed for fault diagnosis.
Another important issue in the proposed approach is to examine the fault di-
agnosability of the system. Given a system and a set of diagnostic requirement, it
is necessary to know if the diagnostic system can diagnose all the faults of interest.
Most prior work on the diagnosability is based on the results of the deterministic
FSA model. They simply define the fault to be diagnosable or nondiagnosable.
The FSA model of the system is nondeterministic in our work, therefore, the diag-
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nosability of the nondeterministic FSA model is especially studied. The definition
of the diagnosability includes the fault to be diagnosable, possibly diagnosable and
nondiagnosable, which is different from the previous definitions of diagnosability.
Furthermore, the diagnosability of the continuous system is discussed before prob-
ing the diagnosability of the DES system.
The ability to enhance the fault diagnosability of the system has important
meaning for the designed system. However, most of the approaches stop after
giving the system model and studying the diagnosability of a system. In our ap-
proach, the state space is partitioned by a set of boundaries of the state variables,
the crossing of which denotes an event noted by the diagnostic system. If the
boundary has not been appropriately chosen, the useful information may be lost
when mapping the continuous domain to the discrete domain and the fault maybe
is not diagnosable. Therefore, the choice of boundary set influences the fault diag-
nosability of the system. In this work, we present how to “adapt the boundaries” of
the state variables to achieve the fault diagnosability of the system. The result has
significance on its guidance for discretizing the continuous value of the variables
for fault diagnosis using DES. Furthermore, the boundaries also have significant
impact on the computational effort required for the event spaces of a large system.
In this work, some strategies are proposed to dynamically “change the boundaries”
for the sake of the computational effort.
To summarize, the proposed approach provides:
• a framework of fault modeling of systems and the algorithm for on-line fault
diagnosis;
• an approach to analyze the fault diagnosability of the system;
• a scheme to enhance the fault diagnosability of the system.
1.3.2 Overview of the Approach
A model of the system should form a framework which allows reliable fault detec-
tion, but the model alone is often used to describe the behavior of the system and
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not sufficient to accurately and timely detect all possible faults. This information
calls for an “integrated fault diagnosis scheme ” to diagnose the fault.
In this work, a finite-state automaton model (FSA) for fault diagnosis is au-
tomatically obtained by given a process plant described by differential equations
and a set of boundaries of the state variables. A set of Finite-State Automaton
Tables (FATs) are used to represent the FSA, which serve as the input to the fault
detection and isolation algorithm. We introduce the definition of fault diagnos-
ability of the system, identify some conditions for nondiagnosability and provide
an algorithm for testing the fault diagnosability. We discuss the strategies for dy-
namical choice of boundary sets that make a diagnosable system and reduce the
computational complexity.
 
Model the system (including faults as inputs) 
Generate the automaton tables 
Analyze the fault diagnosability 
Give the boundary analysis 
Build the diagnoser 
Figure 1.1. The procedures for building the diagnostic system
The main contribution of this work is that it provides an integrated method
to fault diagnosis using FSA, which lead to a more structured and robust on-
line diagnostic system. Fig. 1.1 illustrates the main procedures for building the
diagnostic system for a dynamic system using our proposed method. The procedure
is as follows:
1. Model the system using FSA from a set of differential equations and a set of
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boundaries of the state variables.
2. Generate the Finite-State Automaton Tables (FATs) representation of FSA
for the normal and the faulty conditions.
3. Analyze the fault diagnosability of the system.
4. Adapt the boundaries if some faults are not diagnosable.
5. Build fault diagnoser to implement on-line fault diagnosis, which include the
on-line computation of FATs with appropriate choice of boundaries.
All the functions are built as different modules in the on-line fault diagnosis
system and the diagnoser can call them according to different diagnosis require-
ment, which enhances the flexibility of the overall fault diagnosis system. In this
thesis, we illustrate the approach on a heat exchanger system and a heating cool-
ing system. The on-line diagnoser constructed in the real time process monitoring
system can accurately and timely detect and isolate the faults using the proposed
method.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the methodology for build-
ing the FSA model of the process plants for fault diagnosis and gives the FATs
representation of FSA model for different conditions. Chapter 3 gives the notion of
the fault diagnosability of the FSA, identifies some conditions for nondiagnosabil-
ity and discusses an algorithm for testing the fault diagnosability of the system.
Chapter 4 provides a method for adapting the boundary set of state variables to
achieve the fault diagnosability of the system. Chapter 5 discusses several strate-
gies for changing the boundary set of state variables to save the computational
effort and presents the on-line fault diagnosis algorithm. Chapter 6 illustrates the
application of the approach on two real process plants, a heat exchanger system
and a heating cooling system. Chapter 7 summarizes the main contribution of
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this thesis, compares our proposed approach with other related research work and
recommends the directions for the future research work.
Chapter 2
Modeling for Fault Diagnosis
using FSA
We investigate in this work a new approach to fault diagnosis using Finite-State
Automaton (FSA), which has been broadly used in the Discrete Event Systems
(DES) modeling approach. In this approach, we attempt to get a nondeterministic
FSA model of a system from a set of ordinary differential equations (ODE) of
a continuous system and a set of boundaries of the state variables in ODE. For
the nondeterministic FSA model, given an initial state, the model may record
all the possible event traces in the system. The Finite-State Automaton Table
(FAT) is used as a representation of FSA and it tabulates all the possible state
transitions. For the modeling of faults, the faults of interest are combined as
inputs to the ODE describing the continuous system. Then the FSA model of a
system with faults is mapped from the continuous system by given the ODE with
fault inputs. A set of Finite-State Automaton Tables (FATs) generated under the
normal input and under fault inputs are used for the fault detection and isolation
algorithm. If the physical system is very large, the discrete states and event spaces
may result in an inevitable state explosion and the computational effort to obtain
DES from continuous system may also become very large. Taking advantage of
the structural properties, such as the sparsity of the system, this effort can be
significantly reduced.
16
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The organization of this Chapter is as follows: In Section 2.1, we introduce
the FSA model and present a methodology for constructing it. In Section 2.2, we
discuss the representation of FSA. In Section 2.3, we present the modeling method
for fault diagnosis using FSA. In Section 2.4, we discuss the hierarchical decompo-
sition approach which eliminates the state explosion problem. In Section 2.5, we
summarize the work presented in this chapter.
2.1 Finite-State Automaton (FSA) Model
We define a finite-state automaton M as a 5-tuple:
M(U,X, Y, f, g) (2.1)
where:
U :: finite set of discrete-inputs
X :: finite set of discrete-states
Y :: finite set of discrete-outputs
f :: transition function f : U ×X −→ P (X)
g :: output function g : X −→ Y
We denote by P (X) the set of subsets of X. The transition function f gives,
for each discrete input u˜ (u˜ ∈ U) and the discrete state x˜ ( x˜ ∈ X), the set
of next possible discrete states in X. If the output Y is taken equal to X, the
output function g and the set of discrete outputs Y is not used. With the latter
simplification finite-state automaton becomes 3-tuple:
R(U,X, f) (2.2)
For each x˜ and u˜, if the next discrete state f(x˜, u˜) is uniquely defined, the automa-
ton is called deterministic. Else, if more than one new discrete states is possible,
the automaton is called non-deterministic. Finite-state automata contains no tem-
poral information, they merely state whether a transition is possible or not. The
automaton table may be used to represent the current discrete state, the input and
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the transition functions. In the following example, an automaton table representing
a non-deterministic FSA is illustrated.
Example
Let us take an example as a non-deterministic FSA, where X = {x˜1, x˜2, x˜3, x˜4}
and U = {u˜1, u˜2}. The transition function is described in Table 2.1 and in Fig. 2.1.
We can see that for the current discrete state x˜1 and x˜2, given an input, two new
discrete states are possible and are not deterministic.
Current State(X) Input (U) Next possible state(s)
x˜1 u˜1 x˜2, x˜3






























Figure 2.1. Example of a transition function in a non-deterministic FSA
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Now we consider an nth order dynamical system described by a set of ordinary
differential equations:
x˙ = f(x), x ∈ <n (2.3)




1 < · · · < βik (k ≥ 1) (2.4)
the crossing of which denotes a discrete event. The coordinate of each state variable
separated by the boundaries is represented by m, m = 1 . . . k. It is assumed that f
is continuous and time invariant. The continuous state variable xi is now mapped
into regions. The βi need not be equidistant, the determination of interval size is
problem specific.
A discrete state of the system (2.3) is denoted by a bounded region in Rn:
x˜ = {x ∈ Rn | βimi−1 ≤ xi ≤ βimi} i = 1 . . . n. (2.5)
Where mi is used as index for the boundaries. For easier notation the following
n-tuple representation of (2.5) will be used:
x˜ = (m1, . . . ,mn). (2.6)
Two discrete states are adjacent if they share an (n−1)–dimensional boundary.
This means, that the corresponding n-tuples coincide on all except one position in
which they differ by one unit. Therefore, x˜1 = (m
1
1, . . . ,m
n
1 ) and x˜2 = (m
1
2, . . . ,m
n
2 )
are two adjacent states if there is one, and only one index j, such that mi1 = m
i
2 for
all i 6= j and mj1 = mj2±1 holds. A transition (discrete event) is recorded when the
system state moves from its existing discrete state to an adjacent discrete state.
After this discretization, the state space is divided into X = {x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜p},
where p =
∏
i (k − 1) is the cardinal number of X.
Given any discrete states in the state space and an input, we may determine
what the next possible discrete states will be. Here we use the method presented
in [34, 35] to obtain the possible discrete events (transitions) from a discrete state
by given the differential equations and the set of boundaries of the state variables.
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Proposition 2.1 : Denote the boundary between any two adjacent states, x˜1
and x˜2 , by Bx˜1,x˜2 , where




, (i 6= j)} (2.7)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Denote in Eqn.(2.3) the j-th coordinate of f by fj. If there exists
a point x0 on Bx˜1,x˜2 such that fj(x0) > 0, then the transition from x˜1 to x˜2 is
possible. Moreover, if the transition from x˜1 to x˜2 is possible, then there exists at
least one x0 on Bx˜1,x˜2 such that fj(x0) ≥ 0.
Proof: in [34].
The consequence of this result is that, in order to assess if a transition between
two adjacent states is possible or not, we need to look at the sign of a coordinate
function of f on the separating boundary. We adopt a two step procedure for this.
For example, if we want to decide whether a transition is possible from x˜1 to x˜2,
we first begin by checking the extremal points of Bx˜1,x˜2 . These are the points of
coordinates
xi = βimi1−1 or β
i




If all these function values have the same sign, it is necessary to search the whole
region to detect if a change of sign occurs. This is done with a numerical opti-
mization method for checking the feasibility of state transitions. A summary of
computing state-transitions is given in Appendix A.
We make the following assumptions on the system : Since only transitions to
the adjacent discrete states are allowed and in order to make the plant model satisfy
the continuity condition, we assume that only one discrete coordinate can increase
or decrease at a time. The circumstance may occur in the system as shown in
Fig. 2.2, in which a trajectory goes through an intersection point. Therefore, there
is a transition from (2,2) to (3,3), which has two discrete coordinate increase at a
time. But this circumstance can be prevented by shifting the boundaries a little
bit as shown by the dotted line in Fig. 2.2 if such an event happened.
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2.2 Representation of Finite-State Automaton
2.2.1 Finite-State Automaton Table Representation
Finite-State Automaton Table is a representation of Finite-State Automaton Model,
which tabulates all possible state transitions. Given a system described by Eqn.(2.3)
and a set of state boundaries by Eqn.(2.4), it is possible to automatically generate
a Finite-State Automaton Table representation of the process. Fig. 2.2 shows an
example for a simple two-dimensional problem. Each of the state variables x1 and
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Figure 2.2. The discrete states and boundaries for a 2-D case
Instead of writing out all possible next states, we simply give for each coordinate
of the current state if a transition to a higher or a lower state (or both) for that
coordinate is possible. For a transition from, say, state (2,2) to (3,2) to take place,
we search for a maximum value of x˙1(t) across the boundary between these states
i.e. x1 = β12 and β
2
1 ≤ x2 ≤ β22 . If this maximum value is positive, we say
that a transition from (2,2) to (3,2) is possible and record “+1” in the automaton
table. Similarly, for a transition from (2,2) to (1,2) to take place we search for
a minimum value of x˙1(t) across the boundary between (2,2) and (1,2). If this
minimum value is negative, we say that the transition is possible and record “-1”
in the automaton table. We shall denote the current state and the next possible
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transitions by Eqn. (2.9) and Eqn. (2.10).
x˜c = (m
1
c , . . . ,m
n
c ). (2.9)
N c = (∆m
1
c , . . . ,∆m
n
c ). (2.10)
where ∆mic = 0,−1,+1 , or ±1 (i = 1, . . . , n, c = 1, . . . , p) means that the next
possible state is“unchanged”, “mic − 1”, “mic + 1”, or “mic ± 1”.
A Finite State Automation Table for a 2-dimensional example is shown in
Table 2.2.







c) (Next Possible State)
(1,1) [+1, +1] (1,1), (1,2), (2,1)
(1,2) [+1, +1] (1,2)(2,2)(1,3)
(1,3) [+1, 0] (1,3)(2,3)
(2,1) [-1, 0] (2,1)(1,1)
(2,2) [+1, -1] (2,2)(2,1)(3,2)
(2,3) [+1, -1] (2,3)(2,2)(3,3)
(3,1) [-1, 0] (3,1)(2,1)
(3,2) [0, -1] (3,2)(3,1)
(3,3) [0,-1] (3,3)(3,2)
Table 2.2. An Automaton Table
2.2.2 Formal Language Representation
An alternative description of the DES in the literature is formal language represen-
tation, which has been widely used in the control [36, 37, 38] and fault diagnosis
[15, 17, 18].
• A finite nonempty set of symbols is called an alphabet, denoted by Σ. σ ∈ Σ
denotes that σ is a symbol in Σ. Thus if Σ = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) then 0 ∈ Σ. A
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finite sequence of symbols from some alphabet is called a word or string over
the alphabet.
• A collection of words is called language. For example, the collection 1, 12,
123, 1234 is a language over the alphabet consisting of digits.
• If w and x are words over any alphabet Σ, then x is called prefix of w if for
some word y(in Σ), w = xy. A suffix is defined similarly. A lauguage is said
to be prefix closed if all the prefixes of that lauguage are also in the language.
• ∑∗ denotes the set of all finite traces of symbols of ∑, including the empty
trace denoted by ². the * operation is called the Kleene closure [39]. For
example, if Σ = (1), then Σ∗ = (², 1, 11, 111, . . .). For any alphabet,
∑∗ is
infinite.
For the sake of convenience, the transition function g is extended from domain
X ×∑ to domain X ×∑∗ in the following recursive manner:
g(x, ²) = x
g(x, sσ) = g(g(x, s), σ) for s ∈∑∗ and σ ∈∑∗
The language generated is represented by: L = {s ∈∑∗ : g(x0, s) is defined },
where x0 is a initial state.
If we use the language representation for the two dimensional case shown in
Fig.2.2, we should define the symbols of event firstly, which is shown in Fig.2.3.∑
= e1, e2, . . . , e24. For the sake of convenience, the transitions to their own
discrete state are not considered as the discrete events. After choosing a discrete
state as the initial state, the language may be generated according to different
systems. For example, for the system shown in Table 2.2, if let the initial state
to be (1,1), the language generated is: L = (e1e2 + e1e15(e4e14 + e21e6e20e14) +
e1e7e17(e10(e4e14 + e21e6e20e14) + e23e12e6e20e14))∗
The language is used to illustrate the event traces in the system. Using the
language, the initial state and the symbol of events should be defined first. The
language is generated based on the fact that the designer knows the working mech-
anism of the system (possible transitions between any discrete states).
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Figure 2.3. The state transitions for a 2-D case
As we discussed before, the FAT has the alternative properties as the language
and furthermore:
• It can reflect the discrete states in the state space and the state transitions
(events) between the discrete states.
• The FAT can be automatically generated and records the possible events of
the system by given the differential equations and the boundaries of the state
variables.
• Given any initial state, the events can be traced automatically using the FAT.
The fault diagnosis method we discuss later may start diagnosis at any discrete
state of the system and monitor the discrete state and the state transitions (events)
on-line. Therefore, we use the FAT representation in our fault diagnosis.
2.3 Modeling for Fault Diagnosis
Consider the dynamic controlled system defined by
x˙ = f(x, u), x ∈ Rn (2.11)
where u represents the control inputs to the system. The Eqn.(2.11) describes the
system under normal working conditions.
Faults occurring in a dynamic system can be component failure, actuator fail-
ure, etc. Component Failure occurs when the elements comprising the physical
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system malfunctions. Actuator Failure may take place in the actuators which are
directly under the control of the supervisor. We assume a fault-free working of the
controller (low level and high level). In this case, the failure of the actuator will
make the system follow the behavior of the discrete input different from the one
issued by the controller.
To incorporate these faults we remodel the Eqn.(2.12) as:
x˙ = f(x, u, d), x ∈ Rn (2.12)
where d represents the fault inputs which introduces terms representing faults in
the system equation. Note that this equation reduces to Eqn.(2.11) when there are
no faults i.e. when d = 0.
Therefore if the system has r discrete fault inputs, then we model
d = {d1, · · · , dr} (2.13)
Where di = 0 or 1 , i = 1, · · · , r. “0” indicates that the fault input i does
not occur and “1” indicates the occurrence of the fault i. An example of such a
format is shown in the Appendix C. No matter what kind of failures occurred,
mathematically our fault model the Eqn.(2.12) means that some of the existing
terms vanish and/or new terms are added.




= (1− d1)0.03F (TJ − TH)VH + (1− d2)× PH + 0.015(TH − TE) (2.14)
In the above equation, there are two kinds of fault inputs d1 and d2. d1 rep-
resents the fault input for the hot valve failure and d2 represents the fault input
for the heater failure. We model the hot valve by VH , which is controlled by a PI
controller. We want to detect the valve stuck closed (no flow) status. The fault of
the valve stuck closed may be modelled by adding the factor (1−d1) to VH . Under
the normal condition (d1=0), there is no changes of VH . When the valve get stuck
closed (d1=1), (1−d1)VH is equal to 0. Then the first part (1−d1)0.03F (TJ−TH)VH
of the equation will vanish. We model the heater coil by PH , which stands for the
heat input to the system. The fault of heater coil may be modelled by adding the
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factor (1− d2) to PH . Under the normal condition (d2=0), there is no changes of
PH . When this heater coil fails (d
2=1), (1− d2)PH is equal to 0. Then the second
part (1− d2)× PH of the equation will vanish.
Having described the behavior of the continuous system with the differential
equation (2.12), we define a set of boundaries for the state variables. We note
that the control input u may be continuous, but which does not pose a problem
as it can be discretized in the same manner as other state variables by defining
an appropriate set of boundaries. Latter is completely general and applies to any
discrete-event observed continuous plant. If the control variables are the outputs of
the lower level PID controllers, we assume that the system may know the next pos-
sible state of the controller by the given the current state of the system. Therefore,
the fault diagnoser does not need predict the trajectory of the control variables.
Each control variable is also partitioned by a set of boundaries (2.4), but the dis-
crete state value of control variables helps to predict the next possible state of
other state variables describing the system.
The FAT generated under the normal condition is denoted by TN , where di = 0,
i = 1, · · · , r. A set of FATs T Fi ∈ T F (i = 1, · · · , r) are generated for each fault
(di = 1) in turn. TN and T F serve as input to the fault diagnosis algorithm.
The algorithm for fault diagnosis may consist of two steps, fault detection and
fault isolation. In the first step, the algorithm compares the traces of the plant with
the traces predicted under TN . A fault is detected whenever there is a deviation
from these traces. In the second step, the algorithm compares the traces of the
plant with the traces predicted under T F . The fault is isolated whenever there is
a match of the trace of the plant in T Fi ∈ T F (i = 1, · · · , r). We will discuss the
on-line fault diagnosis algorithm in details in Section 5.2.
An event trace from discrete state x˜a to discrete state x˜b under a certain con-
dition C (C = N,Fi(i = 1 · · · r)) is defined as trab (C). The superscript represents
the beginning discrete state and the subscript represents the ending discrete state.




2(F2). We note that
the event trace is defined in one direction.







(F1) (N,F1) (N,F1) 
(F2) (F2) 
Figure 2.4. An example of state transitions
Because of the serial nature of computing devices, one can identify a “line” that
communicates the event information in a serial manner to the automaton, which
makes it impossible to detect simultaneous crossing of boundaries IF the detector
is observing individual co-ordinates. Therefore, only one discrete coordinate can
increase or decrease at a time and the events between any two adjacent discrete
states are specific. For the sake of representation of events, we use representation
shown in Table 2.3 to describe the transitions between any two adjacent discrete
states x˜i and x˜j (i, j ∈ 1 · · · p, i 6= j). The symbol of events (condition) need not
be specified.
Representation Explanation
x˜i → x˜j A transition from x˜i to x˜j
x˜i ← x˜j A transition from x˜j to x˜i
x˜i ¿ x˜j Transitions between x˜i and x˜j
Table 2.3. Transitions representation for adjacent states
2.4 Computational Effort
One of the disadvantages of the state discretization of continuous plants is the
computational effort, which is necessary to obtain these models. The underly-
ing combinational growth characteristic is known as the state-explosion problem.
However, this problem is mainly related to the number of the state variables and
the boundaries assigned to each state variable in our system. Two methods will
be discussed that can be used to reduce the computational effort.
Chapter 2. Modeling for Fault Diagnosis using FSA 28
2.4.1 The Sparsity of the System
For both nonlinear and linear systems the number of computations can be reduced
by exploiting the sparsity of the system. Even though the system is physically large
and maybe is represented by hundreds of differential equations, in many cases, only
a part of differential equations are sparse functions of fault inputs. That means
only a part of the differential equations (state variables) must be used for the
fault diagnosis purpose. We make an assumption that the state variables are all
observable before we use the above method to obtain the system model for fault
diagnosis.
Furthermore, we know that only a part of the state x, the control input u and
the fault input d influences the derivative x˙i, which makes sense to consider the
sub-systems of the overall system such that the sum of the computations for the
individual systems is less than for the overall system. In general, the state space is
partitioned in ν subspaces. The new state z is a permutation of the original state
components and is decomposed as z = [z1, · · · , zν ]T . The differential equations
in (2.12) are now partitioned accordingly such that we have ν sub-systems, z˙i =
fi(wi, vi, oi), where wi, vi, oi is a vector consisting of those components x
j, uj, dj of
x, u, d that influence z˙i directly.
The computational effort to obtain discrete-event models of all these subsystems
may be significantly less than creating the complete model at once. Since the
computation can be done in parallel for all the sub-models and more computation
time can be gained. A supervisory system may be used to reconstruct the complete
state from the information provided by the sub-models. In this case, a supervisor
is used to extract the necessary information for each sub-model and to reconstruct
the complete state from the information provided by the sub-models. This requires
extracting w˜i,v˜i,o˜i from x˜,u˜,d˜ for each of the sub-models (as shown in Fig.2.5).
For example, a three tank as in Fig.2.6 consists of three communicating tanks.
The input u = (u1, u2, u3, u4, u5) of the system control the valves, where ui ∈ 0, 1
(closed/open). The first and the last tank can be filled by the flow F1 and F2 re-
spectively. Only the last tank has a drain. The state vector x = [x1, x2, x3]T is given
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Figure 2.6. Three tank system
by the water levels in each tank. We associate 5 fault inputs d = (d1, d2, d3, d4, d5)
according to five valves controlling the inputs. Therefore,
x˙1 = f1(x
1, x2, u1, u3, d1, d3) (ODE1)
x˙2 = f2(x
1, x2, x3, u3, u4, d3, d4)(ODE2)
x˙3 = f3(x
2, x3, u2, u4, u5, d2, d4, d5) (ODE3)
If we are only interested in d1, we may just use the ODE1 and state variable x1.
The ODEs will be changed accordingly for different requirements. For this case, d3
will be removed from the ODE1. If we are interested in d1 and d3, the ODE1 and
ODE2 , the state variables x1 and x2 will be chosen. d4 will be removed accordingly
from the ODE2.
If we exploit the structure of the system, we can see that a single tank is not
influenced by all the inputs or the level of the fluid in all the other tanks. In fact,





































Figure 2.7. Considering the tanks separately
instead of considering the three tank system as one system it is also possible to look
at the tanks separately (Fig.2.7). By this the original state space is partitioned in




the differential equations in the form
z˙1 = f1(x
1, x2, u1, u3, d1, d3) = f1(w1, v1, o1)
z˙2 = f2(x
1, x2, x3, u3, u4, d3, d4) = f2(w2, v2, o2)
z˙3 = f3(x
2, x3, u2, u4, u5, d2, d4, d5) = f3(w3, v3, o3)
where w1 = [x
1, x2]T ,v1 = [u
1, u3]T ,o1 = [d
1, d3]T , w2 = [x
1, x2, x3]T ,v2 = [u
3, u4]T ,o2 =
[d3, d4]T , w3 = [x
2, x3]T ,v3 = [u
2, u4, u5]T ,o3 = [d
2, d4, d5]T . The discrete event
model of each separate system will be computed and then the complete discrete-
event model will be obtained for the three tank system. The detailed information
of the sparsity of the system and the computation for the sub-models are in [40].
2.4.2 The Choice of the State Space
Another method is effective for reducing the discrete states and computation effort
where a part of the state space is of particular interest. Instead of using one
discrete-event model for the complete state space region, the state space is divided
into many subspace regions and the sub-models of each subspace are obtained. On
one side, only a small set of boundaries need to be allocated to the subspace region,
so the discrete states of the subspace is much smaller compared with the discrete
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states needed by the complete space region; On the other side, local refinement of
the state space increase the representation accuracy of the system. Furthermore,
as discussed in the last section, the computational effort to obtain discrete-event
models of all sub-systems may gain more computation time than creating the












Figure 2.8. The discrete-event model by choosing the subspace of the system
For the practical application, most process plants normally contain different
working stages, which also makes it efficient to use sub-models for different phases
[41]. This is achieved by choosing the different subspace and allocating the different
boundary set to the system for different phases. A supervisory system may be used
to switch between all these sub-models in the whole process. For how to choose
the boundaries for the subspaces, we will discuss this issue in details in Section 5.1.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have discussed the modeling method for fault diagnosis using
FSA. To summarize, the modeling procedures is as follows:
1. Obtain the differential equations of a dynamical system and define the com-
mand input and fault input vector.
2. Give a set of boundaries to the state and input variables.
3. Check the feasibility of state transitions and generate the FATs under the
normal and fault conditions.
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From Section 2.1, we may see that unlike the other modeling method in DES,
our modeling need the mathematical model of continuous system. The advantage
of our modeling method is that the resulted DES from the mathematical model is
more accurate and complete, and coincide with the actual continuous system. A
disadvantage of the state discretization of continuous plants is the state-explosion
problem. This problem can be better solved by probing the sparsity of the system
and choosing the different subspace of the system. The computational effort can
be significantly reduced through these methods.
Chapter 3
Fault Diagnosability of FSA
In a FSA model for fault diagnosis, the normal and the fault status of the system
components are represented by states while their results are described by normal
and failure events. The main purpose is to detect and isolate the occurrence of
these failure events. If there are no differences of these events (traces) under the
normal and fault conditions, we can not detect and isolate the fault. In this chapter,
we will discuss some issues on the fault diagnosability of our diagnostic system.
As our FSA model is obtained from the continuous system, we first analyze the
fault diangosability of continuous system. Then according to the connection of the
continuous domain and the discrete event system, we further give the definition of
the fault diagnosability of FSA model. The FATs which serve as input to the fault
diagnosis algorithm will be the main focus of the discussion.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, we analyze the
fault diagnosability of the system in continuous domain. In Section 3.2, we give
the definition of the fault diagnosability of the FSA and discuss the typical non-
diagnosable circumstance. In Section 3.3, we give the procedures for testing the
fault diagnosability of the system. In Section 3.4, we illustrate these concepts with
a two tank system example. In Section 3.5, we summarize the ideas presented in
this chapter.
33
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3.1 Analysis of the Diagnosability of Continuous
System
As discussed in Chapter 2, the plant operates in the continuous domain, with
respect to the outside viewer it provides discrete-event measures on the plant states
and acts on commands and disturbances. It displays an event dynamic behavior.
Two types of elements realize the connections between the continuous plant and
the discrete-event dynamics of the plant: on the input side, a zero-order hold
element is usually used to convert the discrete signals into continuous signals; on
the other side, the continuous measurement of the plants is discretized by the limit
(boundary) detectors, which is called (state) event detectors . They operate on
single variables, such as temperature, pressure and so on. It simply detects the
crossing of the limit (boundary), whereby the boundaries are an ordered set of
distinct quantities and the detector will generate the information of the direction
of the crossing.
As an event is defined as a transition across a face of the hypercube, the con-
struction of the automaton is based on analyzing the direction of the gradient on
the surface of each hypercube defining a discrete state. Since the hypercube’s faces
are aligned with the co-ordinates of the state variables, the analysis is identical to
analyzing the sign of the gradient of each component (state variable), with which
changing at its equilibrium surface.
The equilibrium surface for the ith component given values for command inputs
and disturbance is
x˙i = fi(x, u, d) = 0 (3.1)
for which we define the inverse function.
xi0(k, l) = f
−1
i (x
i, u, d) = 0 (3.2)
where k ∈ K, K includes all the combinations of the control inputs, l ∈ L, L
includes all the possible working conditions of system and the vector xi is the
original state vector but with the ith state variable deleted. The vector functions
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are very sparse with respect to all quantities, which makes the individual problem
rather small indeed. This function represents a hypersurface of the dimension
n − 1 in the n-dimentional state space, which we call the ith component (state
variable) equilibrium hypersurface. For the discussion here, it is assumed that
all the mentioned elements are properly defined. In the case where the system is
stable for the component, the surface is within the state domain. In the case where
the system is not stable with respect to the viewed state variable, the equilibrium
hypersurface is at either + or - infinity.
For reasonable kind of systems, a component equilibrium hypersurface divides
the continuous state space into two parts, one in which the sign in the respective
direction is positive and the other one in which the direction is the opposite. The
automaton provides, as explained before, information about the direction of the
continuous trajectory. In order to diagnose faults one must thus make use of the
difference in the directionality of the system operating at different fault modes.
For the purpose of the mathematical definition, we define the subspace in which
the ith component of the gradient assumes the sign s:
Xi,s(k, l) = {x ∈ V|s = sign(x˙i) = sign(fi(x, u, d))} (3.3)
Where V represents the part of state space in which the plant operates. l ∈ Li,
Li includes all the possible conditions related to the i
th component. It includes
“0”, which means the normal condition; It includes “q” kind of faults (q ∈ 1 · · · r),
which are those faults that have an effect on the ith component.
We look at the intersections of the subspaces in which faults can be detected
or isolated. For this purpose, we define a non-empty subset LA,i ⊂ Li for which










Based on Eqn.(3.4), we can define different types of subspaces by selecting
different index set and the measured direction. Different types of overlapping
subspaces are defined in Table 3.1.
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s detected -s detected
∃Oi,s 6= 0
∧
LA,i = 0 no fault a fault
∃Oi,s 6= 0
∧
LA,i = q fault q no fault q
∃Oi,s 6= 0
∧
LA,i ⊂ Li behavior j ∈ LA,i behavior j ∈ Li − LA,i
Table 3.1. Different types of overlapping subspaces
With the event detectors discretizing the state space and defining at least one
boundary of the state variable in the overlapping domain defined by its component
equilibrium hypersufaces under different conditions, it results in an automaton that
has the capability to detect a fault or exclude a fault in the first case, isolate the
fault q or exclude its occurrence in the second case or states that current behavior
belongs to a set of the conditions or not in the third case. These are the basic
results that can be obtained from the simple measurement of the directions.
3.2 Notation of the Diagnosability of FSA
The system diagnoses the faults by using the difference in the directionality of
the system operating at different conditions. The diagnosability of the continuous
domain is that, if there exists an overlapping subspace of any component where
the direction of the fault mode is different from the other modes, then the system
can diagnose such a fault. When mapping to the discrete domain, if at least one
boundary of the state variable is allocated in such an overlapping domain defined
by this state variable, the resulted automaton can diagnose such a fault from the
event detection.
The FATs representation of FSA generated from the dynamic system are used
to capture all the events of the system. According to the directionality information
provided by the FATs, the diagnoser may tell the fault can be diagnosed from which
discrete state. Based on the diagnosability of the continuous domain, if the discrete
state associated with the required boundary is in the overlapping subspace where
the direction of the fault mode is different from the other modes, the fault can be
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diagnosed with an event detection. In the discrete domain, we give a definition as
follows:
Definition 3.1
A fault Fi (i = 1 . . . , r) is one event diagnosable from a discrete state, if this
discrete state is represented by x˜c (x˜c ∈ X, c = 1, . . . , p), the next possible transi-




Fi 6= N cTK (3.5)
Where TK = TN , T Fj , j 6= i.
Eqn.(3.5) means that, given the discrete state, if the next possible transition
(event) in the automaton tables T Fi is different from the other automaton tables,
then the fault Fi is one event diagnosable from this discrete state. Simply, we call
such a discrete state a “one event diagnosable discrete state” (x˜onediag) for fault Fi.
This can be called “one event diagnosability”.
One target of our system is to examine whether the fault is diagnosable or
not from all discrete states if the fault possibly happened in any of the discrete
states. Most of the times a fault is not diagnosable only through one event detection
because the overlapping subspace discussed above cannot be the whole state space.
The fault Fi may happen in a discrete state x˜a that is not in such a overlapping
subspace, if there exists a event trace traonediag(Fi) to a “one event diagnosable
discrete state” (x˜onediag) under the condition Fi, we still consider the fault Fi is
possibly diagnosable from x˜a. Therefore, we define three different cases for the
fault diagnosability.
Definition 3.2
A fault Fi (i = 1 . . . , r) is diagnosable from a discrete state x˜c, if all the event
traces (M) from this discrete state can reach a “one event diagnosable discrete
state” as defined in Definition 3.1 under the condition Fi, that isM× trconediag(Fi).
We call such a discrete state a “diagnosable discrete state” for fault Fi.
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Definition 3.3
A fault Fi (i = 1 . . . , r) is possibly diagnosable from a discrete state x˜c, if
some of the event traces (N < M) from this discrete state can reach a “one event
diagnosable discrete state” as defined in Definition 3.1 under the condition Fi, that
is N × trconediag(Fi). We call such a discrete state a “possibly diagnosable discrete
state” for fault Fi.
Definition 3.4
A fault Fi (i = 1 . . . , r) is nondiagnosable from a discrete state, if no event
traces (0) from this discrete state can reach a “one event diagnosable discrete
state” as defined in Definition 3.1 under the condition Fi, that is 0× trconediag(Fi).
We call such a discrete state a “nondiagnosable discrete state” for fault Fi.
The above three cases are illustrated in Fig.3.1. To simplify the problem, the
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Figure 3.1. Definition of the diagnosability
The definition of diagnosability we discussed above is based on the assump-
tion that the corresponding events must happen for a certain type of failures. A
special circumstance may happen in the system that, in some discrete states, “no
events” happen for some type of failures, that is the next possible transition is
“0”. Therefore no events can be detected for such kind of failures. For a normal
designed system, the system should change its discrete state value unless it reaches
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the steady state. Therefore, it means that the system cannot be stuck at a tran-
sient discrete state under the normal condition. If such kind of failure happened
in a discrete state, for example, a “stuck closed” pump failure causes the system
to be stuck at a discrete state, it is obvious that the stuck-closed failure of the
pump cannot be diagnosed in this discrete state using the existing event detection
method. In this case, a simple method is to give a timing specification to such a
discrete state, that is an event must happen within the specified time. If the time
for the system staying at a discrete state is beyond what is specified, the diagnostic
engine may infer that the related fault has happened in such a discrete state. The
associate timing specification can be constructed from the information provided by
the FATs.
Definition 3.5
A fault Fi (i = 1 . . . , r) is diagnosable from a discrete state with timing, if this
discrete state is represented by x˜c (x˜c ∈ X, c = 1, . . . , p), the specified timing for
this discrete state is represented by tsc and the real timing the system stays at x˜c




Eqn.(3.6) means that, given the discrete state, if the real timing of the system
staying at this discrete state trc is longer than the specified timing for this discrete
state tsc, then the fault Fi is diagnosable from this discrete state. Simply, we call
such a discrete state as a “diagnosable discrete state with timing” for fault Fi.
Actually, the above method uses the timing event detection, that is an event is
triggered when the timing boundary is reached. When using this method, Defini-
tion 3.2 to Definition 3.4 may not only base on “one event diagnosable discrete
state”, but also base on “diagnosable discrete state with timing”. Fig.3.2 illus-
trates this circumstance. We note that “one event diagnosable discrete state” and
“diagnosable discrete state with timing” belong to “diagnosable discrete states”.
Definition 3.6









One event diagnosable 
discrete states/ diagnosable 
discrete states with timing 
tr(Fi) 
  tr(Fi) tr(Fi) 
tr(Fi) 
Figure 3.2. Definition of the diagnosability with additional “diagnosable discrete
state with timing”
A fault Fi (i = 1 . . . , r) is defined diagnosable in the state space if all the
discrete states in this state space are “diagnosable discrete states”.
To summarize, from the fault diagnosability point of view, it requires that
every fault leads to unique identification of the event within a finite number of
transitions. Therefore, for each discrete state in a diagnosable system there should
be a difference in the predicted event traces between the automaton table under
any fault condition T Fi and the automaton tables under the other conditions.
Definition 3.7
A set of discrete states x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜s ∈ X are said to form the same terminating
path under different FATs (conditions), if for each FAT there exists:
1. x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜s form a event trace with x˜t → x˜t+1 , t = 1 . . . s− 1.
2. x˜a → x˜1 , but x˜a has transitions to other discrete states not belong to
x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜s, a 6= 1 · · · s
For example, in Fig.3.3, discrete states 4 and 5 form the same terminating
path under the tables TN and T Fi . Discrete state 3 cannot be included in the
terminating path as it also has transition to discrete state 1.
Definition 3.8
A set of discrete states x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜s ∈ X are said to form the same cycle under
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3 4 1
3 5 4 2 
5 T N 
T Fi 
Figure 3.3. Example for the same terminating path
different FATs (conditions), if for each FAT there exists:
1. x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜s form a cycle with x˜t → x˜t+1 and x˜s → x˜1, t = 1 . . . s− 1.
2. x˜a → x˜1 , but x˜a has transitions to other discrete states not belong to
x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜s, a 6= 1 · · · s
For example, in Fig.3.4, discrete states 4 and 5 form the same cycle under the
tables T Fi and T Fj .
 
3 5 4 1 
3 5 4 2 
TFi 
T Fj 
Figure 3.4. Example for the same cycle
Proposition 3.1 : If a set of discrete states form the same terminating path
under any different FATs (conditions), these conditions cannot be separated from
this set of discrete states.
Proof : From Definition 3.7, there exists no difference of the event traces if a set
of discrete states form the same terminating path under different FATs (conditions).
There are no transitions to a discrete state that these conditions can be separated.
Therefore, these conditions cannot be separated from such a set of discrete states.
¥
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For example, Fig.3.3 illustrates discrete state 4 and discrete state 5 form the
same terminating path under two automaton tables TN and T Fi . In each case,
there is a possible transition from discrete state 4 to discrete state 5 and there is
no possible transition (event) from discrete state 5. There is no difference for these
two event traces from discrete state 4 to discrete state 5 and they cannot reach a
discrete state that these two conditions can be separated. Therefore the fault Fi
cannot be diagnosed in this set of discrete states.
Proposition 3.2 : If a set of discrete states form the same cycle under any
different FATs (conditions), these conditions cannot be separated from this set of
discrete states.
Proof : From Definition 3.8, there exists no difference of the event traces if a set
of discrete states form the same cycle under different FATs (conditions). There are
no transitions to a discrete state that these conditions can be separated. Therefore,
these conditions cannot be separated from such a set of discrete states. ¥
For example, Fig.3.4 illustrates discrete state 4 and discrete state 5 form the
same cycle under two automaton tables T Fi and T Fj . In each case, the only possible
transition from discrete state 4 is discrete state 5 and the only possible transition
from discrete state 5 is discrete state 4. It is not possible to distinguish between
event traces for discrete state 4 and discrete state 5 belonging to T Fi and T Fj .
Therefore, Fi and Fj cannot be isolated from such a set of discrete states.
As our system is nondeterministic, three circumstances may happen in the sys-
tem, that is from a discrete state, a fault may be diagnosable, possibly diagnosable
or nondiagnosable by checking all the possible event traces from this discrete state.
From Fig.3.1, we may see that if the nondiagnosable circumstance doesn’t exist,
the fault can be diagnosable from all the discrete states. Therefore, we will mainly
focus our attention on the set of the discrete states from which the fault is not
diagnosable.
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3.3 Testing the Diagnosability
As we discussed in Section 3.2, for each discrete state in a diagnosable system, there
should be a difference between the automaton table under any fault condition T Fi
and the automaton tables under the other conditions. Therefore, when testing the
diagnosability of any fault Fi, the FAT T
Fi is compared with the FAT TN and
also is compared with the FAT T Fi under the other fault conditions. The testing
procedure for the fault diagnosability is shown in Fig.3.5.
Step 1: From the comparison, the system searches for the “one event diagnos-
able discrete states”. If the timing event detection method is used, the
“diagnosable discrete states with timing” will also be listed out. In both
two cases, the fault can be diagnosed with one event detection.
Step 2: Examine the discrete states that can reach the “one event diagnosable
discrete state” or the “diagnosable discrete states with timing”. These
discrete states belong to “diagnosable discrete states” or “possibly diag-
nosable discrete states”.
Step 3: The left discrete states are the “nondiagnosable discrete states” that can-
not reach the “one event diagnosable discrete state” or the “diagnosable
discrete states with timing”.
Step 4: Examine the discrete states that are the results from Step 2. The dis-
crete states that can reach the “nondiagnosable discrete states” are the
“possibly diagnosable discrete states” and the other discrete states are
“diagnosable discrete states”.
When checking the diagnosability of the system, the representation for different
cases is shown in Table 3.3. For example, “0” represents a “nondiagnosable discrete
state”, “1” represents a “diagnosable discrete state”. Here “diagnosable discrete
state” includes “one event diagnosable discrete state”. Different representation
is used for different cases to make more clearer to the diagnostic engine. The
“diagnosable discrete state with timing” also belongs to the “diagnosable discrete
state” and it is listed as a separate case because the diagnostic engine will associate
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Figure 3.5. Procedures for testing the fault diagnosability
a timing specification for the “diagnosable discrete state with timing”.
0 “nondiagnosable discrete state”
1 “diagnosable discrete state”
2 “possibly diagnosable discrete state”
3 “diagnosable discrete state with timing”
Table 3.3. The representation of different cases of diagnosability
The above procedure let us know how many discrete states in which a fault
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is diagnosable, possibly diagnosable or nondiagnosable and how many faults are
diagnosable in the state space. Using this method, we will not only know the
diagnosability of the system, but also further know the degree of diagnosability
[42] of the system. We may define the degree of diagnosability in two parts for
our system, one is the proportion of the discrete states in the state space from which
a fault is diagnosable and another is the proportion of faults that are diagnosable
in the state space. This result may provide the designer valuable information and
give the direction for the reconstruction of the diagnoser.
3.4 Example
Now we consider a real process example shown in Fig.3.6. This plant contains two
interacting tanks and a pump.
 
Pump 






Figure 3.6. Two tank system
The state variables x1 and x2 describe the deviation of the water level in tanks
A and B from a common reference value. The valve between the two tanks is
either “open” or “closed”. The pump can perform two different actions: “open”
or “closed”.
The flow rate between the two tanks is assumed to be a(x2− x1) and the cross
section of each tank is denoted by F . The flow rate is positive when the water
flows from tank B to tank A, and it is negative for the opposite direction of flow.
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The pump may be controlled, which is expressed by the control variable u1. The
control variable has two values: 1 or 0. 1 means “on” and 0 means “off”. The
working condition of the system is shown in Table 3.4:
Symbol Condition Explanation
d1 = 0 and d2 = 0 normal the valve and the pump are both open
d1 = 1 failure of the valve the valve is stuck closed
d2 = 1 failure of the pump the pump is stuck closed




= (1− d1) a
F





= (1− d1) a
F
(x1 − x2) (3.8)
The parameters in this example are chosen as F = 1m2, a = 10−2m2sec−1,
r = 10−2m3sec−1.
For the purpose of our discussion, we define several instances of discrete control
input and disturbance input. The index k ∈ K = {1, 2} and the index l ∈ L =
{0, 1, 2} respectively. Six cases are generated from this sets of the inputs. Table
3.5 summaries the component equilibrium hypersurfaces for all the cases, which in
this system are straight lines. Fig.3.7 shows the phase diagram of two tank system
for case 1-3.
The top red line is the equilibrium line for state variable x1 at no fault. Above
this line, the sign of x1 is negative and below it is positive, as one would expect
with a stable system. The lower red line is the equilibrium line for state variable
x1 when the pump failed. The blue line is the equilibrium line for state variable
x2 under no fault and the pump failed.
The different subspaces for this example can be found in Table 3.6.
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case k l u1 d1d2 x10(k, l) dyn x
2
0(k, l) dyn
1 1 0 1 0 0 x2 + 1 + x1 +
2 1 1 1 1 0 x1 → x1+ - x2− ≤ x2 ≤ x2+ 0
3 1 2 1 0 1 x2 + x1 +
4 2 0 0 0 0 x2 + x1 +
5 2 1 0 1 0 x1− ≤ x1 ≤ x1+ - x2− ≤ x2 ≤ x2+ 0
6 2 2 0 0 1 x2 + x1 +
Table 3.5. Component equilibrium surfaces for all the cases (+ indicates stable, -






























Figure 3.7. Phase diagram of two tank system for case 1-3
Looking at the direction x1, one may find that fault 2, namely the failure of
the pump is diagnosable, because the subdomain is non-empty. In this simple case
the result can be interpreted by Fig. 3.7. It is the stripe in the middle (purple) in
which case 3 move in the negative direction while the other two cases move in the
positive direction.
O1,−1(1, 2) = X1,−1(1, 2) ∩ X1,+1(1, 0) ∩ X1,+1(1, 1) (3.9)
Furthermore, fault 1 is also diagnosable from the directional information of the
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case k l u1 d1d2 X1,−1(k, l) X1,+1(k, l) X2,−1(k, l) X2,+1(k, l)
1 1 0 1 0 0 x1 > x2 + 1 x1 < x2 + 1 x2 > x1 x2 < x1
2 1 1 1 1 0 0 x1 > x1− 0 0
3 1 2 1 0 1 x1 > x2 x1 < x2 x2 > x1 x2 < x1
4 2 0 1 0 0 x1 > x2 x1 < x2 x2 > x1 x2 < x1
5 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
6 2 2 1 0 1 x1 > x2 x1 < x2 x2 > x1 x2 < x1
Table 3.6. Subspaces for each case
state variable x1, because the subdomain is also non-empty. It is the upper-left
triangle (yellow) in Fig.3.7, in which case 2 move in the positive direction while
the other two cases move in the negative direction.
O1,+1(1, 1) = X1,+1(1, 1) ∩ X1,−1(1, 0) ∩ X1,−1(1, 2) (3.10)
The component x2 does not provide any information except if the process does
remain in any of the three stripes (Fig.3.7) then one may infer fault1 (case 2). This
case has been discussed with timing event detection in the discrete domain.
When mapping the continuous domain to the discrete domain, it is obvious
that if a boundary of the state variable across the diagnosable overlay subspace of
the component for a fault, the fault is diagnosable. This is corresponding to “one
event diagnosable” of fault defined in the discrete domain.
Now we allocate 4 boundaries for each of the 2 state variables and examine









i = 1 0m 1m 2m 3m
i = 2 0m 1m 2m 3m
Table 3.7. Boundary set of the state variables
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Figure 3.8. The boundaries of two tank system
Given the system equations Eqn.(3.7) and Eqn.(3.8) and the boundaries in
Table 3.7, three automaton tables are generated: one is generated under the normal
condition (N) and two are generated according to each fault defined (F1 “valve
failure” and F2 “pump failure”). Each automaton table consists of 9 discrete state
combinations. The FATs generated are shown in Table 3.8. A transition diagram
from the FATs is shown in Fig.3.9. 
1,1 
2,1 2,2 2,3 


















Figure 3.9. The transition diagram of two tank system
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(1,1) [+1, 0] [+1, 0] [0, 0]
(2,1) [0,+1] [+1, 0] [−1,+1]
(3,1) [−1,+1] [0, 0] [−1,+1]
(1,2) [+1,−1] [+1, 0] [+1,−1]
(2,2) [+1, 0] [+1, 0] [0, 0]
(3,2) [0,+1] [0, 0] [−1,+1]
(1,3) [+1,−1] [+1, 0] [+1,−1]
(2,3) [+1,−1] [+1, 0] [+1,−1]
(3,3) [0, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0]
Table 3.8. The FATs generated for the two tank system
Following the procedures in Section 3.3, the diagnosability of F1 and F2 are
checked. The resulted diagnosable information of F1 and F2 is shown in Table 3.9.
The values in the tables are explained in Table 3.3.










Table 3.9. The diagnosable information of the FATs
From Table 3.9, we can see that the valve failure is not diagnosable in the
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discrete states (1,3),(2,3),(3,3), these three states form the same terminating path
under the Normal, Fault 1 and Fault 2 conditions. The pump failure is not diag-
nosable in the discrete state(3,3), it forms the same circle under the Normal, Fault
1 and Fault 2 conditions. The valve failure is diagnosable in the discrete state
(3,1),(3,2) with a timing event detection. The pump failure is diagnosable in the
discrete state (1,1),(2,2) with a timing event detection. These timing specifications
can be built in the diagnostic engine from the information provided by the FATs.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed the diagnosability of the FSA for fault detection
and isolation problem. We first analyzed the diagnosability of the continuous
system and illustrated how it influences the diagnosability of the discrete domain.
Then we proposed the definition of the diagnosability of the discrete domain based
on the FATs, which mainly consists of three cases: the fault is “diagnosable”,
“possibly diagnosable” or “nondiagnosable” from a discrete state. We analyzed the
nondiagnosable circumstance and gave the procedures for testing the diagnosability
of the system. After checking the fault diagnosability, the diagnostic system will
provide the information on the list of faults that could have possibly happened
in the system. This information can provide the operators in their diagnostic
task. Furthermore, the nondiagnosable information can guide the designer who is
interested in altering the diagnosability of the system to reconstruct a diagnosable
system.
In the continuous domain, a fault can be diagnosed if there is difference be-
tween the trajectory of the variables under the fault condition and the trajectory
of the variables under the other conditions. Mapping to the discrete domain, if
the boundary set of the state variables has not been appropriately chosen, which
may cause diagnosable information of the continuous domain to be lost and the
fault event cannot be detected in the discrete state domain even though there is
difference of the trajectories in the continuous domain. Therefore, the diagnosabil-
ity of the system is influenced by the boundary set of the state variables. In the
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following chapter, we will discuss how to adapt the boundary set to change the
diagnosability of the FSA.
Chapter 4
Choice of Boundaries for Fault
Diagnosability
Using a model of a real world system always means abstraction and simplification;
hence, a model has to focus on one aspect of the system. The quality of a model
can only be appraised on the background of its application. For the fault detection
with finite state automata there are two main objectives:
• First of all, the model based on finite state automata should form a framework
which allows reliable fault detection.
• Second,the method tries to avoid the numerical combinational explosion,
which is one of the disadvantages for DES modeling method.
In this approach, the fault detection and isolation depends on the information
of the discrete event system. However, the discrete event system (a finite state
automaton) is derived from the continuous system. The construction of a finite
state automaton is based on analyzing the direction of the gradient on the surface
of the each hypercube defining a discrete state. The hypercube’s faces are defined
by a set of boundaries in each co-ordinates of the state variables, which are also
implemented in the discrete observer for this derivation. If a trajectory crossing the
surface exists, a transition in or out of the analyzed hypercube exists in the DES,
whereby the sign indicates the direction. Every face of the hypercube combined
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with a direction is associated with a particular event.
The diagnosability of the continuous domain indicates that, if there exists an
overlapping subspace of any component where the direction of the fault mode
is different from the other modes, then the system can diagnose such a fault.
Mapping to the discrete domain, if the boundary set of the state variables is not
appropriately placed, which may lose the diagnosable information in continuous
system and cannot detect the fault event in the discrete state domain. Therefore,
the placement of boundaries in the continuous state space affects the diagnosability
of the DES system. Furthermore, the choice of boundary set not only influences
the fault diagnosability of the system; when the number of the boundaries increase,
it also has significant impact on the computational effort required for dynamical
computation of the FATs (FSA). In this chapter, we will mainly discuss the choice
of boundaries for fault diagnosability. Dynamical computation of the FATs with
different boundaries will be discussed in the next chapter for on-line fault diagnosis.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1, we give analysis
of the boundaries according to the fault diagnosability. In Section 4.2, we discuss
the steps and algorithm to adapt the boundary sets of state variables to make a
diagnosable system. In Section 4.3, we illustrate the algorithm using the two tank
system. In Section 4.4, we summarize the ideas presented in this chapter.
4.1 Analysis of Boundaries
The choice of the boundary sets is not a trivial task because selection of the right
level of abstraction requires the knowledge of the application domain. Placing
the boundaries is a matter of judgement on how much or how long one allows
the process to proceed before one detects the fault. The user may give a set
of boundaries according to the range of his interest. However, the resulted FSA
may affect the fault diagnosability of the system. If some faults are not diagnosable
using the generated FSA, with the available computational algorithm [34], [43], the
boundary set can be dynamically adjusted. This provides us the useful information
that the boundary set can be reallocated dynamically for the fault diagnosability
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purpose. Normally, the boundary is adapted according to the range given, which
will not affect much of the other application considerations when the boundary
was first allocated.
In order to diagnose faults we use difference in the direction of the system op-
erating at different modes. In a subspace in the continuous domain, if direction of
the fault mode is different from the other modes, this fault is diagnosable. The au-
tomaton provides the information about the direction of the continuous trajectory.
This implies that the boundaries must be suitably placed in the subspace where
the direction of fault mode is different from the others, which corresponds to the
“one event diagnosablility” of the fault in the discrete domain. Then we will have
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 : In the defined state space, for a fault q (q ∈ 1 · · · r), if there
exists Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) in the continuous domain, then at least one set of the
boundary can divide the state space to make fault q diagnosable in the discrete
domain.
Proof : In the continuous domain, for a fault q, there exists Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n),
then the fault q is diagnosable in Oi,s(k, q). Mapping to the discrete domain, if
a boundary of the component i is allocated in Oi,s(k, q), the fault q is “one event
diagnosable” because a fault transition can be detected across such a boundary.
The diagnosability of the faults in the state space is based on the “one event
diagnosablity” of each fault. Therefore, if Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) exists for fault q,
at least one set of the boundary can divide the state space to make the fault q
diagnosable in the discrete domain.
In the discrete domain, if there are no such a set of boundary to make a fault
q diagnosable, which means “one event diagnosability” of fault q does not exist.
Correspondingly, in the continuous domain, Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0 does not exist.¥
Lemma 4.1 : In the defined state space, for a fault q, if there exists “diagnosable
discrete states/possibly diagnosable discrete states“, then at least one set of the
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boundary can divide the state space to make fault q diagnosable in the discrete
domain.
Proof : For fault q, if there exists “diagnosable discrete states/possibly diagnos-
able discrete states“, then there must have “one event diagnosable discrete state”
for fault q. The diagnosability of the faults in the state space is based on the “one
event diagnosablity” of each fault. Therefore, at least one set of the boundary can
divide the state space to make the fault q diagnosable in the discrete domain. ¥
When using the “timing event detection”, “one event diagnosable discrete state”
also includes the “diagnosable discrete state with timing”.
From Chapter 3, we know that a fault q is diagnosable from a discrete state
or not is not only checked from “one event diagnosability”. If there is a event
trace including fault q can reach a “one event diagnosable discrete state” from
this discrete state, this discrete state is also a “diagnosable discrete state”. The
main reason for nondiagnosable circumstance is that a set of discrete states form
the same “terminating path/cycle” under different conditions and cannot reach a
“diagnosable discrete state”. We assume that fault q is nondiagnosable in a nondi-
agnosable subspace, there are two ways to solve the nondiagnosable circumstance:
the first one is to find Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) in this nondiagnosable subspace and
reallocate the boundary of component i; the second one is to find a component
equilibrium surface xi0(k, q) = 0 in this nondiagnosable subspace and reallocate
the boundary of component i. The first method is used to find a “one event diag-
nosable discrete state” in this nondiagnosable subspace and the second method is
used to find a transition out to a “diagnosable discrete state” for fault q from this
nondiagnosable subspace.
Proposition 4.2 : For a subspace in the state space, if there does not exist a
component equilibrium surface of any component, no boundary set allocating in
this subspace can change the diagnosability of the faults in this subspace.
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Proof : In the continuous domain, if there does not exist a component equilib-
rium surface of any component in a subspace, the direction of each component has
the same sign in this subspace. No matter how to allocate the boundaries in this
subspace, the generated events in this subspace are the same. Therefore, it cannot
change the diagnosability of the faults in this subspace. ¥
Lemma 4.2 : In the nondiagnosable subspace for fault q, if the component equi-
librium surface xi0(k, q) = 0 does not exist, no boundary set in this nondiagnosable
subspace can change the diagnosability of fault q in this nondiagnosable subspace.
Proof : In the nondiagnosable subspace for fault q, if xi0(k, q) = 0 does not
exist, the direction of any component i under the fault q has the same sign in
the nondiagnosable subspace. No matter how to allocate the boundary in the
nondiagnosable subspace, the generated events of any component are the same
under the fault q. Therefore, no boundary set in this nondiagnosable subspace can
change the diagnosability of fault q in this nondiagnosable subspace. ¥
In the following section, we will illustrate the strategies step by step on the
choice of the boundary set of the state variables to make the faults diagnosable.
4.2 Adapting the Boundaries
The boundaries of the state variables are often first allocated in the range of in-
terest. Then the FATs for the FSA can be generated and the diagnosability of
the FSA can be tested. If some faults are not diagnosable in some subspaces, the
boundary can be reallocated for fault diagnosability. From Chapter 3, we know
that if there are no “nondiagnosable discrete states”, the faults should be diagnos-
able in the state space. Therefore, when reallocating the boundaries, the attention
will be focused on the nondiagnosable subspaces that consists of a set of nondiag-
nosable discrete states. The boundaries will also be adapted in a small ranges in
the nondiagnosable subspace or near the nondiagnosable subspace. In this way, it
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may not affect the fault diagnosability of the other parts in the state space and
the range (application) of interest when first allocated the boundaries.
There are some principles for adapting the boundaries.
• If more than two faults are not diagnosable in a subspace, the boundaries are
adapted for one fault at one time.
• If more than two state variables satisfy the condition for adapting the bound-
aries, only the boundary of one state variable will be adapted. Furthermore,
only one boundary of the state variable will be changed at one time.
Because of the interaction of some state variables, these principles are used to
better track the tendency of a state variable according to one fault at one time. This
is especially useful for some faults that are nondiagnosable in the same subspace.
Now we assume that some faults are not diagnosable in some subspaces. In
order to reduce the computational effort, except for the case that a fault is nondi-
agnosable in the whole state space, which means all the discrete states are “nondi-
agnosable discrete states” for this fault, some conditions (such as the overlapping
subspace of a state variable for the fault) will be checked in the whole state space.
Otherwise, some conditions are only checked in the nondiagnosable subspace and
the boundary is adapted in the nondiagnosable subspace. If the conditions are not
satisfied in the nondiagnosable subspace, the conditions will be checked in an adja-
cent diagnosable subspace where the index of a state variable increases/decreases
one unit and the index of the other state variables are the same. The boundary
of the state variable between the nondiagnosable subspace and the adjacent di-
agnosable subspace will be adapted accordingly. The checking conditions mainly
include:
• The overlapping subspace of a state variable that the fault is diagnosable in
the nondiagnosable subspace. The purpose is to find the “one event diagnos-
able discrete state” for this fault in the nondiagnosable subspace.
• The component equilibrium line of a state variable under the fault in the
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nondiagnosable subspace. The purpose is to find a transition out to a “diag-
nosable discrete state” for this fault from the nondiagnosable subspace.
In the subspace that the fault is not diagnosable, we define the boundary limit
for each state variable i in this subspace as βiai ≤ xi ≤ βibi (ai ≥ 0, bi ≤ k, i ∈ n).
βiai represents the minimum boundary of state variable i in this subspace and β
i
bi
represents the maximum boundary of state variable i in this subspace. For example,
the shadow in Fig.4.1 represents a subspace in which the fault is not diagnosable. In
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Figure 4.1. A fault is nondiagnosable in the shadow subspace
Now we assume that a fault q is nondiagnosable in the state space or a subspace,
the analysis and the procedures for adapting the boundaries are summarized in the
following 3 steps.
Step 1: If all the discrete states are “nondiagnosable discrete states” for fault
q, Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) is searched in the state space. If Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0 does
not exist, the fault q is not diagnosable in the state space. There is no need to
change the boundary set. If Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0 exists, the boundary of component i,
βimi (m
i 6= 0, k) near the Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0 is allocated in the Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0. The FATs
are regenerated and the diagnosability of the system is rechecked.
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Step 2: If some parts of the discrete states are “nondiagnosable discrete states”
for fault q, the other discrete states are “diagnosable discrete states” or “possibly
diagnosable discrete states” for fault q. From Lemma 4.1, there exists a set of
the boundary to make fault q diagnosable in the state space. Then the boundary
can be adapted for fault q. The subspace where the fault q is nondiagnosable is
checked:
1. Check if Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) exists. If Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) exists and
βiai ≤ xi ≤ βibi , the boundary βiai ≤ βimi ≤ βibi (mi 6= 0, k) is allocated in
the Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0. The FATs are regenerated and the diagnosability of the
system is rechecked.
2. If Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) does not exist, check if xi0(k, q) = 0 exists. If xi0(k, q) =
0 exists and βiai ≤ xi ≤ βibi , the boundary βiai (ai 6= 0) or βibi (bi 6= k) is
set across xi0(k, q) = 0 and make a transition out from the nondiagnosable
discrete state. The FATs are regenerated and the diagnosability of the system
is rechecked.
3. When using the “timing event detection”, if xi0(k, q) = 0 does not exist,
xi0(k, q) = 0 (q ∈ l, q 6= q) exist and βiai ≤ xi ≤ βibi , the boundary βiai
(ai 6= 0) or βibi (bi 6= k) is set across xi0(k, q) = 0 and make a transition out
from the nondiagnosable discrete state. The FATs are regenerated and the
diagnosability of the system is rechecked.
4. If the conditions in Step 2.1 to Step 2.3 do not exist, then the algorithm will
go to step 3.
Step 3: Check a subspace that is adjacent to the subspace that the fault is
nondiagnosable. Choose the boundary of a state variable i that βiai−1 ≤ xi ≤ βibi
(ai 6= 0) or βiai ≤ xi ≤ βibi+1 (bi 6= k). The boundary of the other state variables
will be the same as before, that βj
aj
≤ xj ≤ βj
bj
(j ∈ n, j 6= i)
1. Check if Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) exists. If Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) exists, the
boundary βiai (if β
i
ai−1 ≤ xi ≤ βibi) or the boundary βibi (if βiai ≤ xi ≤
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βibi+1) is allocated in the Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0. The FATs are regenerated and the
diagnosability of the system is rechecked.
2. If Oi,s(k, q) 6= 0(i ∈ n) does not exist, check if xi0(k, q) = 0 exists. If




ai−1 ≤ xi ≤ βibi) or the bound-
ary βibi (if β
i
ai ≤ xi ≤ βibi+1) is set across xi0(k, q) = 0 and make a transition
out from the nondiagnosable discrete state. The FATs are regenerated and
the diagnosability of the system is rechecked.
3. When using the “timing event detection”, if xi0(k, q) = 0 does not exist and
xi0(k, q) = 0 (q ∈ l, q 6= q) exist, the boundary βiai (if βiai−1 ≤ xi ≤ βibi)
or the boundary βibi (if β
i
ai ≤ xi ≤ βibi+1) is set across xi0(k, q) = 0 and
make a transition out from the nondiagnosable discrete state. The FATs are
regenerated and the diagnosability of the system is rechecked.
4. If the conditions in Step 3.1 to Step 3.3 do not exist, then the algorithm
choose another adjacent subspace as shown in step 3 and then follow the
same steps from Step 3.1 to Step 3.3.
Fig.4.2 illustrates the algorithm of adapting the boundaries for fault diagnos-
ability.
In this algorithm, after giving the new boundary set of the state variables as
discussed in the above procedures, the new FATs are generated and the fault di-
agnosability of FATs is tested. The number of the nondiagnosable discrete states
is recalculated. If the number of the nondiagnosable discrete states is not equal
to 0, the process will continue. Sometimes the number of the nondiagnosable dis-
crete states is not less than the number last time calculated, this may occur when
the state variable and the boundary of the state variable is not chosen suitably,
the system will return the boundary set last time given and choose another state
variable which satisfies the condition to calculate again following the same proce-
dures. When the number of nondiagnosable discrete states is equal to 0, the new
boundary set and the new FATs will be updated. In this algorithm, the number of
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Figure 4.2. Algorithm of changing the boundaries for fault diagnosability
nondiagnosable discrete states is an important parameter to control the flow of the
algorithm, which may be set to different value according to different requirement.
As we know, the computation time will increase with the iterations. Sometimes
it is not necessary to require the fault is diagnosable in the whole state space and
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the user may define the subspace of interest where the fault is diagnosable and
the degree of the fault diagnosability, that is to define the number of diagnosable
discrete states (subspace) required. The procedure will stop when it reaches the
target, which may make the algorithm more flexible and save the computational
effort. An example of adapting the boundaries for fault diagnosability is illustrated
in the next section.
4.3 Example
We will continue to use the two tank system example in Section 3.4. If the boundary
set of the state variable is given in Table 3.7, the resulted diagnosable information
of the valve failure F1 and the pump failure F2 is shown in Table 3.9. From the
diagnosable information, the valve failure is not diagnosable in the discrete states
(1,3),(2,3),(3,3) and the pump failure is not diagnosable in the discrete state(3,3).
According to the procedure and algorithm shown in last section, the boundary
set will be adapted according to the diagnosable information shown in Table 3.9.
F1 is first examined following the steps in the last section.
1. According to Step 1, not all the discrete states are “nondiagnosable discrete
states” for F1, therefore Step 1 is ignored.
2. According to Step 2, the subspace including the discrete state (1,3),(2,3),(3,3)
is examined. The condition of Step 2.1 will be first checked and Oi,s(k, 1) 6= 0
does not exist in this subspace. Then the condition of Step 2.2 is checked
and xi0(k, 1) = 0 also does not exist. Because the system uses the “timing
event detection”, the condition of Step 2.3 is checked. For x2, x20(k, 1) = 0
does not exist, x20(k, 0) = 0 and x
2
0(k, 2) = 0 exist, where 2 ≤ x2 ≤ 3. The
condition of Step 2.3 is satisfied. Then a boundary of x2 is reallocated in
the range [2:3]. Because β2b2 = 3 is maximum boundary of x
2, β2a2 = 2 will
be chosen to reallocate to make a transition out from the nondiagnosable
discrete state (3,3). ((3,3) is the terminating point of the terminating path).
From calculation, under the normal (N) and pump failure (F2) conditions,
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dx2
dt
= 0.01(x1−x2). When x1 = 2, if dx2
dt
< 0, then 2(rmin) < x2 < 3(rmax).
[rmin : rmax] is the range that the new boundary value of state variable
can be chosen. In this case, x2 can choose any value between [2:3] for β2a2 .
In our algorithm, normally the new boundary value of the state variable is
rmin + 0.2 × (rmax − rmin) if βiai is reallocated and the boundary value
of the state variable is rmax − 0.2 × (rmax − rmin) if βibi is reallocated.
Therefore the new boundary of x2 is β2a2 = 2 + 0.2× (3− 2) = 2.2. There is
no change of the boundary set of x1.
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Figure 4.3. The new boundaries of two tank system
Given the system equations Eqn.(3.7) and Eqn.(3.8) and the boundaries in
Table 4.1, the new FATs generated for different conditions are shown in Table 4.2.
A transition diagram of the new FATs is shown in Fig.4.4.
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(1,1) [+1, 0] [+1, 0] [0, 0]
(2,1) [0,+1] [+1, 0] [−1,+1]
(3,1) [−1,+1] [0, 0] [−1,+1]
(1,2) [+1,−1] [+1, 0] [+1,−1]
(2,2) [+1, 0] [+1, 0] [+1, 0]
(3,2) [0,+1] [0, 0] [−1,+1]
(1,3) [+1,−1] [+1, 0] [+1,−1]
(2,3) [+1,−1] [+1, 0] [+1,−1]
(3,3) [0,−1] [0, 0] [0,−1]
Table 4.2. The new FATs generated for the two tank system
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Figure 4.4. The new transition diagram of two tank system
From the new transition diagram of two tank system shown in Fig.4.4, we
can see that there is a transition out from (3,3) under the N and F2 conditions.
“F1” can be diagnosed in (3,3) using the “timing event detection”. Following the
procedures in Section 3.3, the diagnosability of F1 and F2 are rechecked. The
resulted diagnosable information of F1 and F2 is shown in Table 4.3. The value in
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the table is explained in Table 3.3.










Table 4.3. The diagnosable information of the new FATs
From Table 4.3, we can see that all the discrete states are “diagnosable discrete
states” for the valve failure (F1) and the pump failure (F2). Among them, the
valve failure is diagnosable in the discrete state (3,1),(3,2),(3,3) with a timing
event detection. The pump failure is diagnosable in the discrete state (1,1) with a
timing event detection. These timing specifications will be built in the diagnostic
engine.
When adapting the boundaries for the fault diagnosability, the selected state
variable and the selected boundary value of a state variable are not limited to one.
From the example illustrated above, the new boundary value β22 of x
2 can be chosen
as 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, etc, which will also make the fault diagnosable. This means that
the boundary sets which can make the faults diagnosable are not limited to one.
There exist many choices of boundary set that can achieve the fault diagnosability
of system. The importance of this work is that we provided a method to adapt the
boundary according to the information of the continuous system, which is more
accurate and fast.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we mainly discussed how to adapt the boundary set of state vari-
ables to make the faults diagnosable. The results provide guidance on the choice
of boundaries of the state variables for the construction of the FAT and have the
following advantages:
• Help to construct the qualitative value of the state variable in the DES.
• Help to identify the failure events in the DES.
• Help to set up the sensor information.
In other methods for fault diagnosis using DES, the state space are normally
formed by the discrete states of state variables which are simply described by “high”
“middle” or “low” symbol. The proposed algorithm has significant meaning for the
DES system whose discrete states are defined by a set of boundaries of the state
variable and represented by the coordinate of the state variable. Especially, it uses
the information of the continuous system and provides the guidance on how to
discretize the continuous value of the variables for fault diagnosis using DES. The
resulted DES is more accurate than the DES whose discrete states use the simple
abstract value.
After using this method, the diagnostic system was not simply to observe the
system behavior and draw inferences about potential faults. The diagnostic system
actively adapts the boundaries of the state variables to alter the fault diagnosability




A method of fault diagnosis using a Finite-State Automaton model (FSA), which
is represented by the Finite-State Automaton Table, has been proposed. It has
been demonstrated that given a system described by differential equations, it is
possible to construct an algorithm, which can dynamically generate automaton
tables and use these for fault detection and isolation. A preliminary study on the
fault diagnosability of the system and choice of boundaries for fault diagnosability
have also been carried out.
In this chapter, we will discuss the details for the on-line fault diagnosis method.
As discussed in the last chapter, for any models, it has both advantages and disad-
vantages. One important objective is to use other assistant strategies to overcome
the disadvantages for detection of the failure.
For DES modeling method, one of the disadvantages is that the discrete states
and event spaces results in an inevitable combinatorial explosion for a large system.
The computation time for generating the FATs increases drastically with the degree
of discretization. In order to reduce the computation effort, one method is to use
a small set of boundaries for a specific region when the FATs are generated on-
line. In Section 5.1, we present several strategies for dynamical choice of small
boundary sets for generating the FATs on-line. In Section 5.2, we give the on-line
fault diagnosis algorithm. In Section 5.3, we discuss the accuracy, efficiency and
robustness of our fault diagnosis system. In Section 5.4, we give some concluding
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marks of this chapter.
5.1 Dynamic Computation of the FATs
The question of computational expense is one of the key problems in the application
of control theory to real world problems. There are a lot of system identification
and state estimation algorithms that yield information about a system. Most of
these methods are only used for off-line identification because they are very complex
and cannot be used in real-time applications. As explained before, one notion for
the development of DES model was the reduction of computational complexity.
There are usually two constraints that limit the complexity of an algorithm.
First, there are requirements concerning the response time of the program. Some
systems and some algorithms require more or less strict real-time processing (i.e. a
guaranteed maximum response time). Hence, the program has to run on a processor
which is fast enough. The more important constraints concern the total costs of
the system. In most cases, there are computers which can perform the operations
in the required time, but in real world applications the price of the control system
is important for its success in the market. The goal is always to do a job with the
least expensive equipment.
For our modeling method, the computation time for an automaton table in-
creases polynomially with the degree of discretization. However, a feature of our
algorithm is the ability to “zoom in” or “zoom out” on the operating region of
interest, with a user specified resolution for the discrete states. This feature helps
to achieve a balanced tradeoff between resolution (and hence diagnosibility) and
the computational effort required for a large operating region. With this facility,
only small tables with boundaries within an operating region are required when
the automaton table is computed on-line as proposed in [43] and [44]. Several
strategies to compute the automaton table are discussed as follows:
• Compute the automaton table for the operating area of the system. If the
system leaves this area of the state space, define a new area and start comput-






































Figure 5.1. Dynamic computation of FAT
ing the transition table. To continue the supervision, start a second process
which computes only the next possible system state. As soon as the first
process finishes the computation of the whole table, start using this table.
• Compute the automaton table for a large area of the state space, but use only
a small number of boundaries. This will yield a small table which is not very
accurate. After this, refine the table locally by computing the transitions for
the current system state.
• Compute only the transitions of the current state and keep a history, so that
there is no need for a re-computation, if the system operates in an closed
cycle. This is especially useful for batch processes.
For the current implementation of fault detection an intermediate method was
chosen. The automaton table which is used covers most of the possible operating
points of the plant. However, from time to time it is necessary to compute a new
automaton table. For the time where the new table is not available, only the
possible transition from the current state defined by the new table is computed.
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This combines two advantage: During normal operation, the system uses a large
automaton table which makes it easier to refine the table and add information
according to the performance of the plant. If this table gets invalid, the system does
not have to wait until a new table is computed, but can operate with transitions
that are computed on demand.
5.2 Algorithm for Fault Diagnosis
The algorithm for fault diagnosis may be separated into two steps, fault detection
and fault isolation. Fig.5.2 illustrates the procedure for fault diagnosis.
Fault detection: The continuous value of the state variables is mapped into
discrete states by a set of the boundaries described in Eqn.(2.4). Given the current
discrete state of the system, fault-detector engine predicts the next possible discrete
state of the system under the table TN . Due to the non-deterministic nature of
these automaton tables, the discrete state predicted is not unique but consists of
a set of possible discrete states x˜Np (k). The engine now compares this set to the
actual discrete state of the system as described by x˜(k). If x˜(k) ∈ x˜Np (k), then
no error is detected. If there is a discrepancy between the predicted discrete state
x˜Np (k) and the actual discrete state x˜(k) of the system, it announces the presence
a fault.
Fault isolation: Fault-detector engine scans the fault automaton tables T F to
find the transition matching with the wrong transitions recorded:
x˜Fp (k) =⇒ x˜(k), where di = 1 (5.1)
Denote the automaton tables containing such transitions as T Fi , that T Fi ∈ T F .
The search engine now lists out the fault corresponding to these automaton tables
which may lead to this transition.
When the system uses the “timing event detection”, the system will check the
discrete state that related to a “time specification”. If the system stay in the
“discrete state” beyond the time limit, it will identify the corresponding fault.
This process is marked by the dotted line in Fig.5.2.
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Figure 5.2. The procedure for fault diagnosis
Normally a set of boundary and a set of FATs were given before the system
starting the fault diagnosis. The diagnosability of FATs also has been checked. If
the system uses the “timing event detection”, according to the diagnosable infor-
mation from the FATs, the system will accociate the timing specifications for some
discrete states and relate to this timing event to the specific fault. Based on these
settings, the system may begin the fault diagnosis.
One important module in the on-line fault diagnosis algorithm is the on-line
computation of the FATs. The strategies for changing the boundaries proposed in
Section 5.1 have no contradiction to the algorithm for adapting the boundaries in
Section 4.2. First is used to prevent the state-explosion and save computational
effort; second is used to achieve fault diagnosability. We may call the first “change
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boundaries” and the second “adapt boundaries” in our diagnostic system. They can
be well combined in our fault diagnosis algorithm. Firstly, according to different
operating regions, the system will “change boundaries”. Secondly, if the new FATs
generated are not diagnosable, the system will “adapt boundaries” to make it
diagnosable. The number of the boundaries defined in the first step will keep
unchanged in the second step. The boundaries will be adapted in a narrow range
as defined in the first step, which will not affect much to the application. The
procedures for computing the new FATs is shown in Fig.5.3.
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Figure 5.3. On-line computation of the FATs
For the implementation of the algorithm, different function is built as different
module in our fault diagnosis system, such as “change boundaries”, “check the fault
diagnosability”, “adapt boundaries” and ”generate the FATs”. The fault diagnosis
system may call any functions (modules) according to different design target. For
example, the users may not care much about diagnosablity of the system, then
given a set of boundaries, the system will run the fault diagnosis algorithm using
FATs without checking the diagnosability. If the users further want to know about
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the diagnosability of the system and don’t want to change the diagnosability of the
system, then the system can check the diagnosability of system without adapting
the boundaries. Therefore, the implementation of the algorithm enhanced the
flexibility of fault diagnosis system.
5.3 Reliability of the Fault Diagnosis System
Reliability of the fault diagnosis system deals with the ability to complete a task
satisfactorily and within the period of time over which that ability is retained. In
this section, we will discuss the requirements needed by a fault diagnosis system
and how our fault diagnosis system met those requirements.
A fault diagnosis system should meet certain requirement as follows:
1. As many as possible true faults should be detected, while as few
as possible false alarms should be triggered.
In our fault diagnosis system, we not only provide the methodology for detection
and isolation of faults, but also give other analysis to fault diagnosis. We analyzed
fault diagnosability of the system and provided an algorithm to test the fault
diagnosability of the system. We gave the strategies for adapting the boundary set
of state variables to achieve the fault diagnosablity of the system. Those analysis
make the system more reliable to detect the faults defined.
2. The delay time between a fault occurrence and a fault declaration
should be small.
We presented in this work a model-based approach to fault diagnosis, which
based on the Discrete Event System framework. We used the Finite-State Au-
tomaton model to get the qualitative model of the continuous system. Temporal
information is completely absent from the current FSA models, which is governed
by the discrete events that cause changes in the discrete states of the system. In
such a model, the delay time between a fault occurrence and a fault declaration
is mainly decided by the boundary set given for the state space. To minimize the
delay time, the state space should be made finer, but it will result in the state
explosion and increase the computational effort and the searching time between
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the discrete states. Therefore, the fault detection process will be slowed down. An
elegant strategy in our fault diagnosis system is its ability to dynamically change
the boundaries and generate the FATs on the fly. A small set of boundaries is
used for a special region so that the computational effort is reduced and at the
same time the delay time between a fault occurrence and a fault declaration can
be guaranteed small.
3. The employed method must be insensitive(robust) to model inac-
curacies(if a mathematical model is used) such as simplification errors
resulting from linearization or unmodeled, usually non-linear compo-
nents, e.g. friction, and external phenomena such as noise, load varia-
tion etc.
As discussed above, Finite-State Automaton model is obtained from a set of
ordinary differential equations (ODE) of a dynamical system and a set of bound-
aries for each state variable in ODE. Unlike the other model-based approaches, the
residues are not calculated, thus reducing the need for exact equations describing
the system and making the approach more robust. Furthermore, the analysis for
fault diagnosability of system and the strategies for adapting the boundary set of
state variables to enhance the fault diagnosablity also increase the robustness to
model inaccuracies. Even though there exists a little inaccuracies of the model, if
the fault diagnosability of the system is guaranteed and then the fault can also be
detected and isolated.
From the above analysis, it can be easily seen that our design system has met the
requirements needed for a diagnostic engine in some ways. As mentioned before,
a model can only focus on one aspect of the system. To increase the reliability
of overall system, an integrated method was used and its advantages was better
illustrated in the above points.
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5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed the on-line fault diagnosis algorithm. We presented
several strategies for dynamical choice of boundary sets for generating the FATs on-
line. The results help reduce the computational effort and help for the construction
of the FAT. We also analyzed the reliability of our diagnostic system.
After putting those functions discussed in the former and current chapters in the
fault diagnosis algorithm, the diagnostic system becomes more integrated, robust
and reliable. Furthermore, all these functions are built as different modules in the
fault diagnosis system, then the fault diagnosis engine can call them according to




In this chapter, we illustrate the application of our proposed method to two process
pilot plants, a heat exchanger (HEX) system and a heating cooling (HC) system.
We build the diagnostic system for the process plant following the procedures
proposed in Chapter 1. We first investigate the process plant and determine the
faulty components and faulty status we are interested in. Then we choose the
suitable state variables and build the corresponding model of the system for the
normal and faulty conditions. The on-line diagnoser monitors the process, provides
different boundary set for different working stages and dynamically generates the
new FATs under the normal and faulty conditions. The fault diagnosability of
the system can be checked by the diagnostic system. If some faults are tested
nondiagnosable, the boundaries of state variables can be adapted to make the
faults diagnosable.
The implementation architecture of the fault detector and isolator is shown in
Fig. 6.1. The low-level control platform was developed in a Pentium PC, which
typically implements the equipment controllers, such as PID controller and multi-
variable controller. It is used to control and collect data from the process plant and
pass the data to the upper supervisory system where the data is analyzed. It con-
veys the information between the process plant and the upper supervisory system
(LABVIEW with its graphical programming interface is used for the implementa-
tion). The upper-level control platform was developed in a SUN workstation. The
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software on the workstation consists of 4 main concurrent processes: the real-time
expert system (RTES) software (G2 software from Gensym Corp. is used for its
good real-time processing ability) for detecting and isolating the faults, one routine
for generating and communicating with the FATs, one for testing the fault diag-




                                                 PC 
Low level controller  
(PID controllers) 
                                             Sun Sparc Workstation 
Automaton  
tables 









Adjust the boundaries 
of state variables 
Figure 6.1. The diagnostic system architecture for process plant
The system receives real-time plant data from the process plant and updates
the state variables for “Current-State” and “Next-Possible-State” based on the
automaton table under the normal condition. As soon as system state does not
follow the trajectory as defined in the automaton table under normal condition,
the system displays an alarm message. It then triggers a search engine to match
the current system trajectory with the trajectory defined in any of the automaton
tables for faulty condition, finally it displays the possible cause for the anomalous
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behavior.
When the system uses the “timing event detection”, the system will check some
discrete states that relate to a time limit when the system is in such a discrete state.
If the system stay in such a “discrete state” beyond the time limit specified, it will
signal the faulty behavior.
One of the important modules of the above implementation is the on-line com-
putation of the FATs. This is to prevent state-explosion of the FATs, thus paving
the way for effective implementation for complex “real-life” systems. To get a
“birds-eye-view” of the system, we divide the entire state-space with coarse bound-
aries i.e. the state-boundaries with greater degree of separation between them.
This will ensure that the FATs have the essential information on the entire state-
space with a small number of discrete-states. Usually we would like to have more
detailed information about the system near its steady-state. Therefore to “zoom
in” on a particular region, we divide only that region with fine state-boundaries
thus having a reasonable amount of discrete-states but for a smaller region in the
state-space. We thus ensure that the FATs are always of manageable dimensions
ensuring faster computation, lesser memory requirement and easier implementa-
tion.
For different working stages, different boundary sets are provided and then a
new set of FATs is generated. The fault diagnosability of the system can be checked
using the FATs. If the faults are tested nondiagnosable on some discrete states,
then the boundary set of the state variables can be adapted in this specific region
to make the faults diagnosable using the new generated FATs. All the previously
discussed algorithms can run off-line or on-line.
In the following sections, we will illustrate some experimental results and make
an extended discussion on these results. Section 6.1 discusses the application of our
approach to a heat exchanger (HEX) system; Section 6.2 illustrates the application
of our approach on a heating cooling (HC) system; Section 6.3 gives the conclusion
of this chapter.
Chapter 6. Applications 80
6.1 Applications to the Heat Exchanger (HEX)
System
This section outlines an implementation of the algorithm on a heat exchanger
system. The schematic of the bench scale process plant is illustrated in Fig. 6.2. A
process liquid is pumped at a preset flow rate from one of the two storage tanks to
an indirect plate heat exchanger, the purpose of which is to raise the temperature
of the process liquid to a predetermined value. The process requires the liquid
stream to be maintained at this temperature for a given period of time. This is
achieved by the use of a holding tube (effectively a distance/velocity lag or ‘dead
time’) followed by a temperature activated diverter valve, which allows only fluid
of the correct temperature to progress through the process (the remainder being
rejected or returned to the feed tank). The process fluid is then cooled by heat
exchanger with incoming feed and by externally supplied cooling water. The plate
heat exchanger consists therefore of three separate but interconnected sections:
feed preheat/regeneration, heating and cooling. The heating section is supplied
with circulatory hot water from an electrically heated reservoir.
 
Figure 6.2. Schematic of the heat exchanger pilot plant
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6.1.1 The State Variables and the FATs
The automaton tables for the system under normal and each of the faulty condi-
tions can be generated dynamically in real-time on the workstation. For ease of
generating and maintaining these automaton tables, it is simpler to break a com-
plex system into a set of simpler subsystems. This aspect of state, known as state
explosion is discussed and dealt in greater detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. In
the process-plant system, the hot water feed along with a part of heat exchanger is
considered as one subsystem and process liquid feeding unit with its solenoid valves
is treated as another subsystem. We are interested in the subsystem that consists
of hot-water Reservoir, pump N2 and the heating zone of the heat exchanger. This
subsystem is marked by the dotted line in the Fig. 6.2.
The equations describing this subsystem is given in Appendix B. The state
variables describing this subsystem are: the hot tank temperature T2, the heeded
feed exit temperature T4 and the HEX exit temperature of heating water T5. The
control variables are the heater coil input, PWR and the speed of the Pump,
N2. The lower level PID controller manipulates PWR and N2 to control the
temperatures T2 and T4.
Under normal operating condition, this subsystem has no discrete-inputs, only
continuous inputs in the form of PWR and N2 which are manipulated by a PID
controller. The theory of calculating FATs can elegantly incorporate these con-
tinuous inputs if they are also discretized into states and are put along side the
state variables in a FAT. So the definition of Current-State not only includes the
state variables T2, T4 and T5 but also PWR and N2. In the current version of the
software, we assume a fault-free working of the lower-level PID controller which
manipulates PWR and N2. So while calculating the Next Possible States(NPS),
we do not calculate the NPS for the PWR and N2. The current discrete-state
values of the control variables are used to predict the NPS of the state variables
only. The future states of the control variables themselves are not predicted.
We will study the effect of two distinct faults namely the heater-coil failure
(PWR = 0) and the heating pump failure (N2 = 0) in this subsystem. These
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faults are incorporated in the mathematical model by the discrete variables d1 = 1
and d2 = 1 respectively. To summarize, in this case study, we have only one FAT
(TN) describing the normal operating condition and two FATs under T F , each
describing one fault.
6.1.2 Experimental Results
In this section some results of this FDI system is illustrated. An attempt has been
made to cover the various areas of interest during the course of operation of the
system.
The workstation receives real-time plant data from the process plant and up-
dates the table for “Current-State” and “Next-Possible-State” (see Fig 6.3). In that
snapshot, the “Current-State” for T2, T4, T5, PWR,N2 is given by (3,3,2,1,1) and
“Next-Possible-State” by (-1,-1,-1,0,0). An anomaly is detected when the system’s
state does not follow the trajectory as defined in the automaton table under normal
condition. Then a fault is announced and the diagnoser engine searches the tables
T F for such transitions. On completion of search the system displays the possible
cause for the anomalous behavior.
State Boundaries
T2 T4 T5 PWR N2
30 25 25 50 0.2
45 40 40 200 0.50
60 50 50 400 0.70
75 65 65 500 0.90
85 75 75 600 1.00
Table 6.1. Coarse state-boundaries for start-up phase
The key issue for effective implementation is to be able to generate the tables
“on-the-fly”. During the start-up phase, the values of the state variables change
rapidly and therefore the state-boundaries need to be “coarse”. This will ensure
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No faulty transitions 
Figure 6.3. Start-up phase with coarse state-boundaries
that the entire region from the start-up to the final steady-state is covered and yet
the computation is kept minimal. Though the state boundaries are spaced out,
any faults which cause a series of wrong transitions can be detected within a short
time as the state variables evolve faster during start-up. The boundary set for
the start up phase is illustrated in Table 6.1 and the start-up phase under normal
condition is illustrated in Fig 6.3.
At about 4:30:00pm a fault is introduced, which is illustrated in Fig 6.4. The
power to the heater coil is turned to “full blast” simulating the failure of the actu-
ator of the heater coil. At this point the state variables T2, T4 and T5 were in states
3, 2 and 2 respectively. The “Next-Possible-State” indicated in the automaton ta-
ble for normal operation is given by −1,−1 and −1 respectively, indicating that
T2, T4 and T5 can only make transitions to the neighboring lower state. But due
to the fault, the temperatures begin to rise and As shown in Fig 6.4, T4 records
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Figure 6.4. Fault detection with coarse state-boundaries
first wrong transitions at about 4:45:00pm. T2 records such transitions even later
at about 4:50:00pm.
But once the system reaches its steady-state fault detection with coarse bound-
aries is very ineffective. Fig 6.5 shows the case when the system is monitored with
refined boundaries as in Table 6.2.
In Fig 6.6, the failure of pump N2 was detected at the steady-state phase.
The “Current-State” for T2, T4, T5, PWR,N2 is given by (3,3,1,3,1) and “Next-
Possible-State” by (+1,+1,+1,0,0). Due to the fault introduced by the failure of
the pump N2, the temperatures T4 and T5 start dropping. The faulty transitions
are recorded and are fed to the diagnoser. The engine now searches the tables T F
for a transition from state (3,3,1,3,1) to (3,2,1,3,1) and so on i.e. transitions where
the drop in temperatures T4 and T5 are predicted. It finds that such a transition
is possible only in the automaton table describing the Pump N2 failure. Since
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State Boundaries
T2 T4 T5 PWR N2
60 49 41 50 0.10
63 52 43 110 0.17
65 54 47 170 0.25
68 57 50 200 0.30
71 59 53 250 0.40
Table 6.2. Refined state-boundaries for subsystem
 
No faulty transitions 
Figure 6.5. Steady-state phase with refined state-boundaries
the diagnoser finds a unique solution in this case, it diagnoses the fault as Pump
failure. The result of the search engine is displayed in the ”Message Board” - that
pump N2 has failed.
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Figure 6.6. Fault detection with refined state-boundaries
6.2 Applications to the Heating Cooling (HC)
System
This section illustrates the application of our fault diagnosis algorithm on a heat-
ing cooling system (HC). The schematic of the heating cooling process plant is
illustrated in Fig. 6.7. The prime working mechanism of the plant is to control
reaction temperature to its designed values at different stages by adjusting cooling
jacket temperature outside the reactor. This can be achieved by controlling some
global valves, such as hot, cold and circulation valves. The hot and cold valves are
connected to a hot and cold tank at set temperatures, which are working as heat-
ing and cooling resources respectively. The high flow rate of heat transfer medium
pumped by a powerful gear pump through the cooling jacket ensures rapid tem-
perature control.



























































Figure 6.7. Schematic of the heating cooling system
6.2.1 The State Variables and the FATs
A simple working cycle of the HC system has three stages: heating up, keeping
at the steady state value and cooling down. The temperature of the reactor is
controlled using proportional controller on the hot valve and the cold valve.
The working condition is set as follows: The heating and the cooling resources
are kept at designed temperature. At the heating up stage, only the hot valve is
used and at the cooling down stage, only the cold valve is used. For rapid temper-
ature control at steady state, the hot valve is used when the reactor’s temperature
is less than the steady state value and the cold valve is used when the reactor’s
temperature is more than steady state value.
The model of the heating cooling system is shown in Appendix C. There are six
state variables including the hot tank temperature TH , the cold tank temperature
TC , the cooling jacket temperature TJ , the reactor temperature TR and two control
variables: the hot valve position VH and the cold valve position VC .
The faults are incorporated by the fault input d1 , d2, d3 and d4. Each kind of
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fault is defined as follows:
1. d1 = 1, failure of the hot valve
2. d2 = 1, failure of the heater
3. d3 = 1, failure of the cold valve
4. d4 = 1, failure of the cooling system
The failure of valve here means there is no flow. Under normal operating
condition, the system has no discrete-inputs, only continuous inputs in the form of
VH or VC which are manipulated by a P controller. The theory of calculating FATs
can incorporate these continuous inputs if they are also discretized into states and
are put alongside of the state variables in a FAT. In the current version of the
software, we assume a fault-free working of the controller. So while calculating the
Next Possible States(NPS), we do not calculate the NPS for the VH and VC . As
the case of heat exchanger system, the current discrete state values of the control
variables are used to predict the NPS of the other state variables describing the
system. The future states of the control variables themselves are not predicted.
There are two automaton tables generated under the normal condition accord-
ing to two circumstances that the hot valve is used for control (VC = 0) or the cold
valve is used for control (VH = 0). When hot valve is used, the faults of interest
are d1 and d2 ; When the cold valve is used ,the faults of interest are d3 and d4.
Totally four automaton tables are generated according to four kinds of faults.
6.2.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we mainly discuss the influence of the choice of boundaries to the
computational effort and the fault diagnosability problem and illustrate with the
experimental results.
For the application to the heat exchanger system, we allocated 5 boundaries
for each of the 5 state variables. Then each automaton table consists of 1024 (45)
discrete-state combinations. For the application to the heating cooling system, if
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we also allocate 5 boundaries for each of the 6 state variables, then each automaton
table consists of 4096 (46) discrete state combinations. The computation time for
the automaton tables increase polynomially after adding one more state variable.
From the control condition, we know that the hot valve and the cold valve are not
used at the same time. When the hot valve is used for control, VC = 0. When the
cold valve is used for control, VH = 0. Therefore, only 5 state variables are used
under one control condition. We still can choose 5 boundaries for each of the state
variable.
When the hot valve is used for control, the system equations are as follows and
















= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (6.4)
When the cold valve is used for control, the system equations are as follows and
















= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (6.8)
If we assume that the cold tank temperature TC is a constant value when the
hot valve is used for control (VC = 0), then the equations (6.1), (6.3), (6.4) and
the state variables TH , TJ , TR and VH are used. If we assume that the hot tank
temperature TH is a constant value when the cold valve is used for control (VH = 0),
then the equations (6.6), (6.7), (6.8) and the state variables TC , TJ , TR and VC
are used. Therefore, for any conditions, four state variables are used to generate
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the automaton table. In this case, if we still choose 5 boundaries for each state
variable, then each automaton table consists of 256(44) discrete-state combinations
and the computational effort will be tremendously reduced compared with using 5
state variables. We will use this model for our implementation.
During the heating-up phase (only the hot valve is used), the system first allo-
cates the boundaries as shown in Table 6.3. One FAT is generated under the normal
State Boundaries
TH TJ TR VH
54 32 25 0.1
58 38 30 0.15
65 45 35 0.25
75 52 40 0.35
82 55 45 0.45
Table 6.3. State-boundaries for heating-up phase (hot valve is used)
condition (hot valve is used) and two FATs are generated under the fault condition
d2 and d2. The discrete state is represented by (mTH ,mTJ ,mTR ,mVH ). The fault
diagnosability of the system is checked and the heater failure d2 is tested nondiag-
nosable on the discrete states (1,4,x,1), where “x” represents all the index from 1 to
4. In this subspace, TH = [54 : 58], TJ = [52 : 55], TR = [25 : 45], VH = [0.1 : 0.15].
The equilibrium surface of each state variable under the normal condition (hot
valve is used) and under the the fault condition d1 and d2 is listed below:
Normal (hot valve is used)
dTH
dt
= 0 = 0.03F (TJ − TH)VH + PH + 0.015(TH − TE) (6.9)
dTJ
dt
= 0 = 0.03F (TH − TJ)VH + 0.0287(TR − TJ) + 0.009(TJ − TE) (6.10)
dTR
dt
= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (6.11)
d1 (hot valve failure)
dTH
dt
= 0 = PH + 0.015(TH − TE) (6.12)
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dTJ
dt
= 0 = 0.0287(TR − TJ) + 0.009(TJ − TE) (6.13)
dTR
dt




= 0 = 0.03F (TJ − TH)VH + 0.015(TH − TE) (6.15)
dTJ
dt
= 0 = 0.03F (TH − TJ)VH + 0.0287(TR − TJ) + 0.009(TJ − TE) (6.16)
dTR
dt
= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (6.17)
From the equilibrium surface of each state variable, we can see that d1 can be
diagnosed using the direction of TH and TJ , d
2 can be detected using the direction
of TH and can be isolated using the direction of TH and TJ . The heater failure is
nondiagnosable because dTH
dt
> 0 under both normal and heater failure conditions
in this subspace.
Following the steps in Section 4.2, the boundaries will be adapted.
1. According to Step 1, not all the discrete states are “nondiagnosable discrete
states” for the heater failure, therefore Step 1 is ignored.
2. According to Step 2, the subspace including the nondiagnosable discrete
states is examined. The conditions of Step 2.1 to Step 2.3 do not exist
in this subspace. Then Step 3 is checked.
3. Check a subspace that is adjacent to the subspace that the fault is nondi-
agnosable. Choose the boundary of a state variable TH that 54 ≤ TH ≤ 65.
The boundary of the other state variables in the nondiagnosable subspace
will be the same as before. Then the first condition of Step 3.1 is checked.
OTH ,s(k, 1) 6= 0 exists. Then the boundary βTH1 = 58 is reallocated. From
the calculation, when dTH
dt
< 0 for heater failure condition, the boundary can
be reallocated in the range [60.6:65]. The new boundary βTH1 of TH is chosen
as βTH1 = 60.6 + 0.2× (65− 60.6) = 61.48 ≈ 61.
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For the heating-up phase (only the hot valve is used), the boundaries is real-
located as shown in Table 6.4. Then the FATs are regenerated and the faults are
tested diagnosable.
State Boundaries
TH TJ TR VH
54 32 25 0.1
61 38 30 0.15
65 45 35 0.25
75 52 40 0.35
82 55 45 0.45
Table 6.4. New state-boundaries for heating-up phase (hot valve is used)
During the heating-up phase, the value of the state variables has wide range
and changes rapidly, therefore the state boundaries need to be “coarse”. Once the
system reaches its steady-state, fault detection with coarse boundaries is ineffective
and has to be made “fine”, the boundaries for the steady-state are shown in Table
6.5(hot valve is used) and Table 6.6(cold valve is used).
State Boundaries
TH TJ TR VH
62 38 34 0.1
66 42 36 0.15
70 44 38 0.2
75 46 40 0.25
80 52 42 0.3
Table 6.5. State-boundaries for steady-state phase (hot valve is used)
Two FATs are generated under the normal condition (hot valve is used and
cold valve is used) and four FATs are generated under the fault condition d1,d2,d3
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State Boundaries
TC TJ TR VC
16 38 34 0.1
20 42 36 0.2
24 44 38 0.25
26 46 40 0.3
28 52 42 0.35
Table 6.6. State-boundaries for steady-state phase (cold valve is used)
and d4. The discrete state is represented by (mTH ,mTJ ,mTR ,mVH )(hot valve is
used) and (mTC ,mTJ ,mTR ,mVC )(cold valve is used). The fault diagnosability of
the system is checked and the cold tank failure d4 is tested nondiagnosable on the
discrete states (1,x,x,4), where “x” represents all the index from 1 to 4. In this
subspace, TC = [16 : 20], TJ = [38 : 52], TR = [34 : 42], VH = [0.3 : 0.35]. The
equilibrium surface of each state variable under the normal condition (cold valve
is used) and under the the fault condition d3 and d4 is listed below:
Normal (cold valve is used)
dTC
dt
= 0 = 0.02F (TJ − TC)VC − PC + 0.016(TC − TE) (6.18)
dTJ
dt




= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (6.20)
d3 (cold valve failure)
dTC
dt
= 0 = −PC + 0.016(TC − TE) (6.21)
dTJ
dt




= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (6.23)
d4 (cooling system failure)
dTC
dt
= 0 = 0.02F (TJ − TC)VC + 0.016(TC − TE) (6.24)
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dTJ
dt




= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (6.26)
From the equilibrium surface of each state variable, we can see that d3 can be
diagnosed using the direction of TC and TJ , d
4 can be detected using the direction
of TC and can be isolated using the direction of TC and TJ . The cooling system
failure is nondiagnosable because dTC
dt
> 0 under both normal and cooling system
failure conditions in this subspace.
Following the steps in Section 4.2, the boundaries will be adapted.
1. According to Step 1, not all the discrete states are “nondiagnosable discrete
states” for cooling system failure, therefore Step 1 is ignored.
2. According to Step 2, the subspace including the nondiagnosable discrete
states is examined. The conditions of Step 2.1 to Step 2.3 do not exist
in this subspace. Then Step 3 is checked.
3. Check a subspace that is adjacent to the subspace that the fault is nondi-
agnosable. Choose the boundary of a state variable TC that 16 ≤ TC ≤ 24.
The boundary of the other state variables in the nondiagnosable subspace
will be the same as before. Then the first condition of Step 3.1 is checked.
OTC ,s(k, 4) 6= 0 exists. Then the boundary βTC1 = 20 is reallocated. From
the calculation, when dTC
dt
< 0 for normal condition, the boundary can be
reallocated in the range [21.2:24]. The new boundary βTC1 of TC is chosen as
βTC1 = 21.2 + 0.2× (24− 21.2) = 21.76 ≈ 22.
Therefore the boundaries is reallocated as shown in Table 6.7. Then the FATs
are regenerated and the faults are tested diagnosable.
During cooling down phase (only cold valve is used), the range of the state
variable has no big changes, so the system uses the same boundary set for steady-
state phase (cold valve is used) shown in Table 6.7.
In Fig 6.8, the failure of heater was detected during the heating-up phase. In
Fig 6.9, the failure of heater was detected at the steady-state stage. In Fig 6.10,
the failure of the cooling system was detected at the steady-state stage.
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Heater failure 
Figure 6.8. Heater failure at the heating-up phase
 
Heater failure 
Figure 6.9. Heater failure at the steady-state phase
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Cooling system  
failure 
Figure 6.10. Cooling system failure at the steady-state phase
State Boundaries
TC TJ TR VC
16 38 34 0.1
22 42 36 0.2
24 44 38 0.25
26 46 40 0.3
28 52 42 0.35
Table 6.7. New state-boundaries for steady-state phase (cold valve is used)
6.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we illustrated our approach to fault diagnosis using two real process
plants, the heat exchanger system and the heating cooling system. We discussed
the various implementation issues and built the diagnostic system using FSA model
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of the plant. We also presented the application of theory and its associated con-
ditions and properties discussed in the last few chapters. The snap-shot of some
results from the experiment was shown, which verified the applicability and flex-
ibility of the proposed method. The nature of the models discussed indicates the
potential applicability of our approach to a wide class of systems.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The organization of this chapter is as follows: In Section 7.1, we summarize the
main contributions of this thesis. In Section 7.2, we compare our work with some
of the other related work to fault diagnosis, which are modelled in the framework
of DES. In Section 7.3, we give some suggestions for future research work.
7.1 Contributions of this Thesis
In this thesis, an integrated fault diagnosis scheme using FSA model is mainly
discussed. The main contributions of this thesis are:
• a framework of fault modeling of systems using FSAmodels and the algorithm
for fault detection and isolation;
• a methodology to analyze and test the fault diagnosability of systems;
• a scheme to adapt the boundaries of the state variables to enhance the fault
diagnosability of the system;
• several strategies to reduce the computational complexity of DES;
• implementation of on-line fault diagnosis for process plants.
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7.2 Comparison with the Related Work
In this section, we will briefly discuss and compare the diagnostic method of our
model with the other related work to fault diagnosis which are modeled in the
framework of DES in the literature.
1. Lin, in [15], proposed a state-based approach to oﬄine diagnosis and on-
line diagnosis. The state space of the system is partitioned into normal and
failed states, and the objective is to identify which element of the partition
the state is in via measurements of the system output. In off-line diagnosis,
the system to be diagnosed is assumed to be in a ‘test-bed’. The diagnostic
system is to issue a sequence of test commands in order to draw inferences on
the possible state of the system. This is a problem of oﬄine diagnosability
or oﬄine testability. In on-line diagnosis, the system is assumed to be in
normal operation when the test commands are sent. Unlike the case of off-
line diagnosis, uncontrollable events may occur during the diagnostic process.
The goal is to design a sequence of appropriate test commands for diagnosing
failed states. The author gives an algorithm, which is guaranteed to converge
if the system is indeed on-line diagnosable. This is a problem of online
diagnosability or online testability. The applications include mixed digital
and analog circuits and exhaust gas recirculation.
2. In [16], Bavishi and Chong further present some results on the testability of
a system whose fault behavior is modeled by a nondeterministic automaton.
Their study are the extension of off-line diagnosability presented in [15].
Testability is viewed as estimating the current state of the system based on
the output information. Two issues are presented: (1) Determine the optimal
set of sensors which would ensure testability of a given system. (2) Given a
fixed set of sensors, determine the infimal partition of the state space, with
respect to which the system is testable. A manufacturing application ( piston
manufacturing cell) is illustrated.
3. In [17, 18, 19], the authors present a methodology for modeling physical sys-
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tems in a DES framework and use it for the construction of a diagnoser. The
automaton model of the system accounts for the normal behavior and the
fault behavior of the system. The goal is to identify which failure events
have occurred based on on-line observations of the system behavior. They
introduce two related notions of diagnosability of DES in the frame work of
formal language. Diagnosability requires that every failure event leads to ob-
servations distinct enough to enable unique identification of the failure type
within a finite delay. The diagnoser performs diagnostics using on-line obser-
vations of the system behavior. They also present an approach for the design
of diagnosable systems by appropriate design of the system controller. The
method is illustrated on a heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC)
system.
In the following, we give a brief comparison of our approach with the above
methods from the modelling, diagnosability of system, diagnostic process and other
issues in fault diagnosis. Our comparison will be based on each of the main con-
tributions of this thesis mentioned above.
Modeling
• In the above methods, the designers model the system by defining the in-
dividual component models and the sensor maps and using the composition
(e.g. the synchronous composition) to obtain the complete model. It is eas-
ily seen that building the individual component models and the sensor maps
may not be a trivial task and calls for the knowledge of the application do-
main and engineering judgement in selecting the right level of abstraction.
Furthermore, the information has to be collected each time for designing dif-
ferent systems. In our approach, the model can be automatically obtained by
given a system described by differential equations and a set of boundaries of
the state variables. The implementation of our modeling is different from the
methods mentioned above. It is easily seen that the modeling will become
more simple, accurate and coincide with the continuous domain if the DES
is directly obtained from the continuous system.
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• The model we developed is another kind of DES model, which also contain
the state and event information that captures both the normal and the faulty
behavior of the system. The characteristics of our model (event) is nonde-
terministic, that is given the current state of the system, it predicts all the
next possible event could happen and not deterministic. This character is
the same as method 2, but it is different from method 1 and method 3.
• Most of the above methods use the language representation of the DES model,
which records the event traces in the system. In our on-line fault diagnosis,
the diagnoser will trace and update both the discrete states (the coordinate
of the state variables) and the events (change of the coordinate of the state
variables) in the system. Therefore, we use the FATs representation to record
both the discrete states and events in the system.
Diagnosability of system
• In method 1 and 2, the authors check the diagnosability/testability through
active “testing” and the output information. In method 3, the authors study
the diagnosability through “passive” analysis of the formal language (sys-
tem). Similarly, we study the fault diagnosability through “passive” analysis
of the FATs. As our model is nondeterministic, which will increase the diffi-
culty for testing the diagnosability of the system. The good point is that we
model the fault in advance in the system modeling, therefore, the diagnos-
ability is tested by comparing the event traces predicted by the FATs under
the normal and the fault conditions. The fault is diagnosable if the event
traces is distinct enough within finite number of the state transitions after
the fault occurred. We further provide some conditions for nondiagnosability.
The result has significance for testing the diagnosability of a nondeterministic
FSA model in fault diagnosis.
Making a diagnosable system
• In method 3, the authors propose the design of diagnosable system by appro-
priate design of the system controller. This consideration must be taken into
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account in the initial design. In our approach, we have proposed a methodol-
ogy to adapt the boundaries to enhance the diagnosability of the system and
make the system diagnosable, which can be done after the initial modeling of
the system. The advantage of this method is that it uses the information from
the continuous system and make the modeling more accurate. The result has
significance on its guidance for discretizing the continuous value of the vari-
ables for fault diagnosis in DES by using the discrete domain information,
which has not been studied by the other approaches.
Diagnostic process
• Our diagnostic system performs on-line diagnosis. Most of the other ap-
proaches do not attempt to explicitly propose methods to reduce the com-
putational complexity of DES approaches. In our approach, we propose to
decompose the system into subsystems and provide the small set of bound-
aries for computing the small tables of FATs on-line. These reduce the com-
putational complexity of DES.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, different approaches to fault diagnosis are cho-
sen for different applications based on many aspects of consideration, such as the
characteristics of the system, knowledge available about the system, etc. The
proposed method is more applicable to continuous dynamic systems or hybrid sys-
tems, which are often used in the chemical plants. The proposed diagnosability
conception and the methodology for making a diagnosable system and reducing
the computational effort can be used in other approaches which obtain the FSA
model from the continuous system.
7.3 Suggestions for Future Work
Several interesting directions remain to be considered for future work. To examine
a few:
• In our system, we use a constant timing information for the “timing event”
detection in some discrete states. Temporal information is completely absent
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from the current FSA models, which restricts attention to untimed discrete
event models. [45] presents on computing the timed Automata from mono-
tone first-principle process models. The timing information may be used in
fault diagnosis to further enhance the capabilities of the diagnostic process.
• In this work, issue of detecting unmodeled faults is not discussed. It would be
interesting to develop other “assisted diagnostic tools” to diagnose unmodeled
faults. These tools would manipulate the inputs and watch the outputs for
the changes. Information thus obtained can be useful for diagnosis.
• In this work, the generation of FATs itself need non-linear differential equa-
tions for the state variables. It would indeed interesting to generate the
information contained in FATs from various other types of models, such as
using artificial neural-networks (ANN) and data mining method.
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Given the system equations and a set of boundaries for each state variable, typi-
cally, four possible cases arise when the program calculates the state transitions.
This is illustrated in Fig A.1. We discuss each of the case here in brief.
1. The function value is positive at all grid-points defining the region. This
means, for the example, that trajectories of the system which start at the
qualitative state (4,3) can cross the boundary and reach the state (5,3) above
the boundary. Checking only the single grid-points does not mean that there
are no trajectories which cross the boundary in the other direction. To check
this, the program searches for the minimum of the state space function in
the region. If a minimum is found and if the state space equations take a
negative value at this minimum, this means that the boundary can be crossed
in the opposite direction too.
2. On the other hand, if the function value at the minimum is still positive, this
means that there is no trajectory which crosses the boundary in the opposite
direction. For the optimization routine, it is very important to find the global
minimum and not get stuck in a local minimum. If the later happens, the
program does not indicate a possible transition although there might be a
global minimum with negative function values.
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Figure A.1. Possible cases of the state space equations
If the function values are negative at all grid-points defining the region, then
the procedure is similar. Trajectories of the system can start in state (5,3)
and cross the boundary to reach the state (4,3). The program now searches
for a maximum of the state space functions. If one is found, transitions from
state (4,3) to state (5,3) are possible too.
3. One special case is shown in Fig. A.1(Case 3). If there are grid-points with
positive and with negative values of the state space functions, it is clear that
trajectories cross the boundary in both directions. Hence transitions are
possible in both directions, and no further optimization has to be performed.
In this case, the computational affort is reduced to a minimum.
4. A second special case occurs, if the function values at the grid-points are
very small. This often happens, if trajectories run asymptotic to the bound-
aries. In this case, it is difficult to make a prediction on possible transitions,
because with small function values the errors due to modeling inaccuracies
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and parameter alteration can have strong effects on the possible transitions.
In this case, the program supposes that no transitions are possible. To pre-
vent false alarms it also writes a note in the log-file for the expert system.
A detailed analysis on handling trajectories asymptotic to the boundaries is
given in [43] and [35].
Appendix B






= (1− d1)PWR− (1− d2)m˙2Cp(T2 − T5) (B.1)
where M = 4.67 kg; Cp = 4180 J/kg
◦C.
Heat Exchanger:
Heating Zone (N1 is kept constant)
dT5
dt






















) + d2(−0.0152T4 + 0.72) (B.3)
Heating Pump:
F2 = 1173N2 − 169.9 (B.4a)
m˙2 = ρw (K1F2) (B.4b)
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Notation:
M Mass of water in the heating
tank in kg
Ni Speed of pump Ni
F1 Flow rate of product in ml/min
F2 Flow rate of heating water in ml/min
K1 Convert ml/min to m
3/sec : 10−6/60
ρw Density of water = 1000Kg/m
3
m˙2 Mass flow rate of heating water in Kg/sec
Ac Area of cross section of product tank in m
3
Cp Heat Capacity of water = 4180 J/Kg
◦C
PWR Heat input by the heater coil in Watts
T5 Heating water exit temp.
from the HX in ◦C
T2 Heating water inlet temp.
to the HX in ◦C
T4 Product temp. at the exit of heating
zone of HX in ◦C
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= (1− d1)0.03F (TH − TJ)VH + (1− d3)0.02F (TC − TJ)VC+




= 0.0287(TJ − TR) (C.4)
Notation:
TH Temperature of hot tank
TC Temperature of cold tank
TJ Temperature of cooling jacket
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TR Temperature of reactor
TE Temperature of enviroment (
◦C)
F Flow rate of product (26l/min)
VH Position of hot valve
VC Position of cold valve
PH Heating input by the heater coil = 3 Watts
PC Cooling input by the cooling system = 2.5 Watts
Appendix D
Part of the FATs Generated for
the Heat Exchanger System
For the application to the heat exchanger system, we have 5 state variables namely,
T2, T5, T4, PWR,N2 and PWR,N2 are control variables. We use 5 state-boundaries
(4 cells) for each of the 5 state-variables, resulting in 1024 (45) discrete-states in
each automaton table. We study the effect of two distinct faults namely the heater-
coil failure and the heating pump failure. Totally, one FAT under the normal con-
dition and two FATs under the fault conditions are generated. Part of the FATs
(start up phase) under different conditions are shown in the following tables.
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Automaton Table - Normal Condition
Current State Next Possible State
T2 T5 T4 PWR N2 T2 T5 T4 PWR N2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 4 1 1 2 0 -1 0 0 0
2 4 1 1 2 -1 -1 0 0 0
3 4 1 1 2 -1 -1 0 0 0
4 4 1 1 2 -1 -1 0 0 0
1 1 2 1 2 0 +1 -1 0 0
2 1 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
3 1 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
4 1 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
1 2 2 1 2 0 +1 -1 0 0
2 2 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
3 2 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
4 2 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
1 3 2 1 2 0 +1 -1 0 0
2 3 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
3 3 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
4 3 2 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
1 4 2 1 2 0 -1 -1 0 0
2 4 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
3 4 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
4 4 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
1 1 3 1 2 0 +1 -1 0 0
2 1 3 1 2 -1 +1 -1 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table D.1. The Automaton Tables for normal condition
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Automaton Table - Heater Coil Failure
Current State Next Possible State
T2 T5 T4 PWR N2 T2 T5 T4 PWR N2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 4 1 1 2 0 -1 0 0 0
2 4 1 1 2 -1 -1 0 0 0
3 4 1 1 2 -1 -1 0 0 0
4 4 1 1 2 -1 -1 0 0 0
1 1 2 1 2 0 0 -1 0 0
2 1 2 1 2 -1 0 -1 0 0
3 1 2 1 2 -1 0 -1 0 0
4 1 2 1 2 -1 0 -1 0 0
1 2 2 1 2 0 -1 -1 0 0
2 2 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
3 2 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
4 2 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
1 3 2 1 2 0 -1 -1 0 0
2 3 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
3 3 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
4 3 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
1 4 2 1 2 0 -1 -1 0 0
2 4 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
3 4 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
4 4 2 1 2 -1 -1 -1 0 0
1 1 3 1 2 0 0 -1 0 0
2 1 3 1 2 -1 0 -1 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table D.2. The Automaton Tables for heater coil failure
Chapter D. Part of the FATs Generated for the Heat Exchanger System 119
Automaton Table - Pump N2 Failure
Current State Next Possible State
T2 T5 T4 PWR N2 T2 T5 T4 PWR N2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 4 1 1 2 +1 -1 0 0 0
2 4 1 1 2 +1 -1 0 0 0
3 4 1 1 2 +1 -1 0 0 0
4 4 1 1 2 0 -1 0 0 0
1 1 2 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
2 1 2 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
3 1 2 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
4 1 2 1 2 0 +1 -1 0 0
1 2 2 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
2 2 2 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
3 2 2 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
4 2 2 1 2 0 +1 -1 0 0
1 3 2 1 2 +1 0 -1 0 0
2 3 2 1 2 +1 0 -1 0 0
3 3 2 1 2 +1 0 -1 0 0
4 3 2 1 2 0 0 -1 0 0
1 4 2 1 2 +1 -1 -1 0 0
2 4 2 1 2 +1 -1 -1 0 0
3 4 2 1 2 +1 -1 -1 0 0
4 4 2 1 2 0 -1 -1 0 0
1 1 3 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
2 1 3 1 2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table D.3. The Automaton Tables for Pump N2 failure
Appendix E
Part of the FATs Generated for
the Heating Cooling System
For the application to the heating cooling system, we have 6 state variables namely,
TH , TC , TJ , TR, VH , VC and VH , VC are control variables. Under each control
condition, only 4 state variables are used. We use 5 state-boundaries (4 cells) for
each of the 4 state-variables, resulting in 256 (44) discrete-states in each automaton
table. We study the effect of four distinct faults: failure of the hot valve, failure
of the heater, failure of the cold valve and failure of the cooling system. There are
two FATs under the normal condition, one FAT is generated when the hot valve
is used for control (VC = 0) and another FAT is generated when the cold valve is
used for control (VH = 0). Four FATs are generated under the fault conditions.
Part of the FATs (steady-state phase) under different conditions are shown in the
following tables.
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Automaton Table - Normal Condition (hot valve for control)
Current State Next Possible State
TH TJ TR VH TH TJ TR VH
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 3 1 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 3 1 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 3 1 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 3 1 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 4 1 2 +1 0 +1 0
2 4 1 2 +1 0 +1 0
3 4 1 2 -1 0 +1 0
4 4 1 2 -1 0 +1 0
1 1 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 1 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 1 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 1 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 2 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 2 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 2 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 2 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 3 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 3 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 3 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 3 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 4 2 2 +1 0 +1 0
2 4 2 2 +1 0 +1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table E.1. The Automaton Table for normal condition (hot valve for control)
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Automaton Table - Normal Condition (cold valve for control)
Current State Next Possible State
TC TJ TR VC TC TJ TR VC
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 3 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
2 3 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
3 3 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
4 3 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
1 4 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
2 4 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
3 4 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
4 4 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
1 1 2 2 +1 0 +1 0
2 1 2 2 -1 0 +1 0
3 1 2 2 -1 0 +1 0
4 1 2 2 -1 0 +1 0
1 2 2 2 +1 -1 +1 0
2 2 2 2 -1 -1 +1 0
3 2 2 2 -1 -1 +1 0
4 2 2 2 -1 -1 +1 0
1 3 2 2 +1 -1 +1 0
2 3 2 2 -1 -1 +1 0
3 3 2 2 -1 -1 +1 0
4 3 2 2 -1 -1 +1 0
1 4 2 2 +1 -1 +1 0
2 4 2 2 -1 -1 +1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table E.2. The Automaton Table for normal condition (cold valve for control)
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Automaton Table - Hot Valve Failure
Current State Next Possible State
TH TJ TR VH TH TJ TR VH
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 3 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
2 3 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
3 3 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
4 3 1 2 0 -1 +1 0
1 4 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
2 4 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
3 4 1 2 +1 -1 +1 0
4 4 1 2 0 -1 +1 0
1 1 2 2 +1 0 -1 0
2 1 2 2 +1 0 -1 0
3 1 2 2 +1 0 -1 0
4 1 2 2 0 0 -1 0
1 2 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
2 2 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
3 2 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
4 2 2 2 0 -1 -1 0
1 3 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
2 3 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
3 3 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
4 3 2 2 0 -1 -1 0
1 4 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
2 4 2 2 +1 -1 -1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table E.3. The Automaton Table for the hot valve failure
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Automaton Table - Heater Failure
Current State Next Possible State
TH TJ TR VH TH TJ TR VH
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 3 1 2 0 -1 +1 0
2 3 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
3 3 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
4 3 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
1 4 1 2 0 -1 +1 0
2 4 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
3 4 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
4 4 1 2 -1 -1 +1 0
1 1 2 2 0 0 -1 0
2 1 2 2 -1 0 -1 0
3 1 2 2 -1 0 -1 0
4 1 2 2 -1 0 -1 0
1 2 2 2 0 -1 -1 0
2 2 2 2 -1 -1 -1 0
3 2 2 2 -1 -1 -1 0
4 2 2 2 -1 -1 -1 0
1 3 2 2 0 -1 -1 0
2 3 2 2 -1 -1 -1 0
3 3 2 2 -1 -1 -1 0
4 3 2 2 -1 -1 -1 0
1 4 2 2 0 -1 -1 0
2 4 2 2 -1 -1 -1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table E.4. The Automaton Table for the heater failure
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Automaton Table - Cold Valve Failure
Current State Next Possible State
TC TJ TR VC TC TJ TR VC
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 3 1 2 0 +1 +1 0
2 3 1 2 -1 +1 +1 0
3 3 1 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 3 1 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 4 1 2 0 0 +1 0
2 4 1 2 -1 0 +1 0
3 4 1 2 -1 0 +1 0
4 4 1 2 -1 0 +1 0
1 1 2 2 0 +1 +1 0
2 1 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
3 1 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 1 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 2 2 2 0 +1 +1 0
2 2 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
3 2 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 2 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 3 2 2 0 +1 +1 0
2 3 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
3 3 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
4 3 2 2 -1 +1 +1 0
1 4 2 2 0 0 +1 0
2 4 2 2 -1 0 +1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table E.5. The Automaton Table for the cold valve failure
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Automaton Table - Cooling System Failure
Current State Next Possible State
TC TJ TR VC TC TJ TR VC
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 3 1 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 3 1 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 3 1 2 +1 +1 +1 0
4 3 1 2 0 +1 +1 0
1 4 1 2 +1 0 +1 0
2 4 1 2 +1 0 +1 0
3 4 1 2 +1 0 +1 0
4 4 1 2 0 0 +1 0
1 1 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 1 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 1 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
4 1 2 2 0 +1 +1 0
1 2 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 2 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 2 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
4 2 2 2 0 +1 +1 0
1 3 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
2 3 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
3 3 2 2 +1 +1 +1 0
4 3 2 2 0 +1 +1 0
1 4 2 2 +1 0 +1 0
2 4 2 2 +1 0 +1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table E.6. The Automaton Table for the cooling system failure
Appendix F
Procedure for Running Diagnoser
of the Heat Exchanger System
Preparation of the plant
1. Switch on the process plant control unit and change all the settings to Manual
mode. Make sure that there is adequate water in both the feed tanks. As a
precaution, never allow the water level in the tanks to be below the 120mm
mark. (Running the peristaltic pumps in dry conditions may damage the
silicone rubber tubes.)
2. Switch on the Feed pump(N1) and Water pump(N2) and place them under
MANUAL control. Keep them at about 4.5 in dial of the control panel.
3. Switch on the Water Heater(PWR) and keep it at about 0.6KW in the MAN-
UAL control. Observe the gradual rise in temperature T2.
4. Switch on the VALVE control and put it in MANUAL mode.
Performing the fault diagnosis experiments.
1. Switch on the PC and go to D:\USER\FAULT_D directory. Type diagnose to
run the program in PC. This program collects data from the process plant
and also runs a lower level PI controller.
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1. Enter the interval to sample the plant on CH0 (1 ... 20000) (ms)
Type - 10000 and press ENTER.
2. Enter the interval for control loop update (5 ... 20000) (ms)
Type - 10000 and press ENTER.
The program starts but the screen will be blank as it awaits a signal from
the Workstation (G2).
2. Switch the VALVE CONTROL to I/O port. This ensures that FEED TANKS
always maintain a minimum water-level.
3. Login to Workstation with username- Labtech and appropriate password.
4. Open a command window by typing- xterm & in window titled -
cmdtool - /bin/sh
5. Change the working directory to fault d by typing - cd fault_d. Verify
that you are in correct working directory by typing pwd. It should show
/data/user/Labtech/fault_d .
6. In this xterm, type- runbridges & and press ENTER. All the GSI bridges
will start automatically.
7. In the File Manager, go to directory /appl/gensym/g2 .
8. Double-click on the g2 executable file. G2 software will load.
9. In G2, load the following KB - /data/user/Labtech/fault_d/diagnoser.kb
A KB can be loaded by clicking anywhere in the G2 workspace and selecting
the Load KB option from the Main Menu.
10. Start the KB but do not run any actions. A KB can be started by selecting
the Start option in the Main Menu.
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11. Wait till the temperature T2 reaches 53 ◦C. When this temperature is at-
tained, click on the Get Plant-Data button in the “Operator-Panel” workspace
of G2. This will get real-time data into the workstation.
12. Go to the process plant controller and switch the Water pump(N2) to IO-
PORT mode and Water Heater(PWR) to INPUT SOCKET mode. This will
complete the switch over from manual mode to PI controller mode.
13. Wait for 5 minutes for controller to stabilize. Then click on the Run Auto-Table
button in the “Operator-Panel” workspace of G2.
14. Finally to the fault diagnoser, click on the Start Diagnosis button in the
“Operator-Panel” workspace of G2.
Shut down sequence
1. In the “Operator-Panel” workspace of G2, click on the Stop Diagnosis,
Stop Auto-Table, Stop Plant-Data button in that order. Data transmis-
sion from PC to Workstation(G2) terminates.
2. Pause the KB using the Pause option from the Main Menu.
3. Reset the KB using the Reset option from the Main Menu.
4. In the control-panel of the plant, switch the Water pump(N2) and the Water
Heater(PWR) to the MANUAL mode. Switch the VALVE CONTROL also
to MANUAL mode.
5. Press ‘Q’ in the PC to stop the program. This will bring the complete set-up
to halt.
6. Discharge the water in the plant and shut down the plant.
Appendix G
Procedure for Running Diagnoser
of the Heating Cooling System
Preparation of the plant
1. Inspect the system to ensure that there are no visible damages or leaks from
the system.
2. Fill up the sump and the water tank.
3. Plug the system and turn on both mains lever switches.
4. Twist the red emergency stop switch in a clockwise direction to reset the
circuit.
5. Press down the green illuminated push button to power up the plant.
6. Turn on the chiller.
7. Ensure that BV1 and BV2 are open.
8. Switch on the PC and go to C:\mydocument\vi directory. Start the PC and
load the LabView program platform.vi. Once the file is loaded, run it by
clicking on the run button.
9. Open valves A, B, C and D fully through platform.vi.
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10. Ensure that BV6 is open and BV5, BV3 and BV4 are closed.
11. Start P4 to fill the plant with oil, and stop P4 when the plant is filled.
12. Run P1 at 10 Hz for around 2 minutes to expel air bubbles out of the pipeline
of the plant, and then stop P1.
13. Close valves A, B and D.
14. Ensure that BV7, BV8 and BV9 are open.
15. Turn on P3, the pump and cooling switches of the chiller in sequence.
16. Turn on P2 and run it at 20Hz to start oil circulation.
17. Turn on heater 1 by pulling down its toggle switch.
Wait for the temperatures of the cold tank and hot tank to reach 20 ◦C and 80 ◦C
respectively.
Performing the fault diagnosis experiments.
1. On the PC, stop platform.vi and run control.vi, which is found in the
same directory.
2. On the Workstation, ensure that the current directory is /home/pielelkw
and run G2 by typing g2 in the console window.
3. In G2, load the following KB - /home/pielelkw/HCsystem/HCrun/diagnoser.kb
A KB can be loaded by clicking anywhere in the G2 workspace and selecting
the Load KB option from the Main Menu.
4. In the directory /home/pielelkw/HCsystem/HCrun, run the program run_bridges
to start the GSI bridges.
5. In the G2 window, start the KB by using the Start option from the main
menu.
6. On the operator panel, click on the Get Plant-Data button. This will get
real-time data into the workstation.
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7. To start monitoring the plant, click on the Run Auto-Table button in the
“Operator-Panel” workspace of G2.
8. Finally to the fault diagnoser, click on the Start Diagnosis button in the
“Operator-Panel” workspace of G2.
Shut down sequence
1. In the “Operator-Panel” workspace of G2, click on the Stop Diagnosis,
Stop Auto-Table, Stop Plant-Data button in that order. Data transmis-
sion from PC to Workstation(G2) terminates.
2. Pause the KB using the Pause option from the Main Menu.
3. Reset the KB using the Reset option from the Main Menu.
4. In LabView, stop ”control.vi” and run ”platform.vi”.
5. Turn off P1.
6. Turn off P2.
7. Turn off cooling, pump and power switches of the chiller in sequence.
8. Turn off P3.
9. Discharging the Plant.
10. Turn off mains lever switches for the system.
11. Push the red stop button to shut off the plant.
Appendix H
Pictures of the Process Plant
 
Figure H.1. The heat exchanger system
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